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The United States Sentencing Commission's recent Sentencing Guide-
lines for organizations1 (the "Guidelines" or "Sentencing Guidelines")
have prompted a long overdue reappraisal of corporate criminal liability
and sentencing. Much of this reappraisal has focused on the fines im-
posed under the new Guidelines.2 Large corporate fines recommended
under the Guidelines have encouraged firm managers to consider new
crime prevention methods in corporate organizations. Corporate blame-
worthiness standards specified in the Guidelines as bases for upward and
downward fine adjustments have focused new attention on standards for
assessing corporate fault in criminal offenses. The Guidelines' reliance
on large fines to deter corporate crimes has renewed debate about the
desirability of corporate criminal liability and fines as means to prevent
corporate offenses.
These reactions to the corporate fines recommended under the Guide-
lines are important, but they overlook another important advance in the
new Sentencing Guidelines. The Guidelines authorize several innovative
corporate sentences aimed at ameliorating the impact of corporate crimes
and at preventing repeat offenses. These sentences include restitution or-
ders for broad categories of crimes, remedial orders mandating cleanups
and other restorative actions beyond restitution, notices to crime victims
1. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 8 (1992) [herein-
after U.S.S.G.].
2. The Sentencing Guidelines set corporate fines based on offense and offender characteristics.
Offense characteristics affecting fine levels include offender gains, victim losses, and other crime
characteristics significant in individual offender sentencing. Corporate offender characteristics that
affect fine size include the participation of top corporate managers in offenses, the scope of preexist-
ing law compliance programs aimed at preventing offenses, and the reporting of internally detected
crimes to public authorities. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1, §§ 8C2.1-8C2.10.
For a detailed discussion of factors affecting corporate fines under the federal Sentencing Guide-
lines, see Richard S. Gruner, Just Punishment and Adequate Deterrence for Organizational Miscon-
duct: Scaling Economic Penalties Under the New Corporate Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L.
REv. 225 (1992).
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to promote individual recoveries, restrictive probation sentences to pre-
vent repeat offenses, and adverse publicity aimed at modifying public at-
titudes toward corporate offenders.
The significance of these innovative sentencing options can be mea-
sured in three frameworks. On one level, these new sanctions permit
sentencing courts to render direct aid to a broad range of parties affected
by organizational offenses. The range of parties potentially benefitted by
these measures include: (1) victims of offenses who are not cognizant of
their status as victims, (2) other victims who are aware that they are
crime victims, but have insufficient resources to press individual damage
claims, (3) further victims who will be prejudiced by the delays required
to obtain damage recoveries through civil suits, (4) employees, custom-
ers, suppliers, lenders, investors, or other parties who may wish to rede-
fine their relationships with corporate offenders (or avoid such
relationships altogether) based on full information about corporate of-
fenses, and (5) the public generally insofar as sentences impose special
conduct constraints or law enforcement monitoring to prevent future
offenses.3
A second framework for measuring the significance of the new sen-
tencing options set forth in the Guidelines relates to their probable im-
pact on corporate prosecutions. The new types of corporate sentences
recommended under the Guidelines appear likely to increase the fre-
quency of corporate prosecutions.4 The availability of corporate
sentences serving the broad remedial and preventive goals described
above may prompt prosecutors to pursue corporate prosecutions that
would be ignored if corporate fines alone were available. This will be
particularly likely when an offense has large numbers of victims and sen-
tencing options such as victim notices or restitution orders will serve the
interests of numerous parties. The availability of innovative probation or
remedial sanctions also may encourage corporate prosecutions for envi-
ronmental offenses. Prosecutors may see these sanctions as means to aid
victims who do not appreciate the source or scope of their injury or to
3. See Special Report: Organizational Prosecutions Present New High-Stakes Game, 8 SEc.
REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 239, 240 (Feb. 21, 1992) (noting that restitution payments determined by
sentencing courts may avoid long discovery and civil trials to resolve damage claims) [hereinafter
Special Report].
4. If prosecutors decide to prosecute corporate employees for an offense benefitting their firm,
the further decision to prosecute the firm will turn on balancing the additional corporate deterrents
and victim remedies to be gained from a corporate conviction against the likelihood that the corpora-
tion will mount a more vigorous defense if joined as a defendant.
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remedy non-pecuniary harm to the environment. The availability of re-
strictive probation sanctions also may make corporate prosecutions more
attractive in environmental or workplace safety cases where the govern-
ment's primary goal is to prevent future injuries rather than just to pun-
ish a corporate offender for past violations.
A third perspective on innovative corporate sanctions is that of corpo-
rate managers in convicted firms. Beyond adding to the general deter-
rence impact of corporate fines, the threat of innovative and often
restrictive criminal sanctions may be particularly important in shaping
post-offense responses to corporate crimes. When imposing innovative
sentences like restitution orders, remedial requirements, or restrictive
probation sentences, sentencing courts will consider the actions of the
corporate defendant up to the point of sentencing and the need for sanc-
tions given those actions. Hence, the threat of restrictive sanctions will
encourage firms to take remedial and reform actions themselves before
they are required to take similar actions in potentially less desirable ways
by a sentencing court. Once managers appreciate that corporate criminal
liability is probable, the sentencing options specified in the Guidelines
identify an agenda for change and remedial action that corporate offend-
ers will often wish to implement voluntarily. Thus, even when they are
not imposed because a defendant organization has already taken correc-
tive actions before sentencing, the innovative corporate sentences recom-
mended under the new Sentencing Guidelines serve a valuable public
purpose by guiding and motivating desirable corporate responses to
offenses.
This Article examines innovative corporate sentences beyond fines. It
emphasizes types of corporate sentences recommended under the United
States Sentencing Commission's Sentencing Guidelines for Organiza-
tions. The Article has four goals. First, it seeks to inform judges, prose-
cutors, defense attorneys and others in the criminal justice community
about these as yet unfamiliar corporate sentencing options. Second, it
explores the policy rationales supporting innovative corporate sentences.
Third, it considers ambiguities in the Guidelines authorizing innovative
corporate sentences and suggests means to resolve these ambiguities.
Fourth, the Article articulates principles for sentencing courts to use in
crafting specific corporate sentences within the broad authorizing lan-
guage of the Sentencing Guidelines. Finally, the Article identifies cir-
cumstances warranting innovative sanctions under the Guidelines, some
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limitations on their use, and sentencing and prosecutorial strategies that
will maximize public benefits from these sanctions.
I. THE ROLE OF NON-TRADITIONAL SANCTIONS IN CORPORATE
SENTENCING
Innovative criminal sanctions like expanded restitution orders, reme-
dial orders or restrictive probation sentences serve important sentencing
goals that are often unsatisfied through other criminal sentences. These
goals include remedying damage from offenses, specifically deterring cor-
porate offenders, and changing corporate management behavior to pre-
vent repeat offenses.
The Sentencing Reform Act of 19841 placed remedial and reform goals
at the heart of federal sentencing. The Act requires federal courts "in
determining the particular sentence to be imposed" on a criminal of-
fender to consider "the need to provide restitution to any victims of the
offense."6 The Act authorized sentences including restitution orders for
a wide range of offenses.7 Restitution is even more strongly supported
under the new Guidelines. The Guidelines reflect the Sentencing Com-
mission's view that, in sentencing an organizational offender, a court
"must, whenever practicable, order the organization to remedy any harm
caused by the offense." 8
The Sentencing Reform Act also established preventive and reform
goals for corporate sentencing. The Act identifies specific deterrence and
offender reform as primary goals of federal sentencing.9 The drafters of
the Act expected criminal sentences for both individuals and organiza-
tions to further these goals. For example, they anticipated that sentenc-
ing restrictions on organizational operations would be used to prevent
repeat offenses.10 In its corporate sentencing guidelines, the Sentencing
5. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 was enacted as part of the Comprehensive Crime Con-
trol Act of 1984. See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987.
6. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(7) (1988).
7. The Act added § 3556 to Title 18 of the United States Code. That section provides for
restitution for all violations of Title 18 and of designated sections of 49 U.S.C. § 1472. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3556 (1988). For all other offenses, federal legislation supports restitution orders imposed as a
condition of probation. See 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(3) (Supp. III 1985).
8. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, ch. 8 (Introductory comment.).
9. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (Supp. III 1985); S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 76 (1984),
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182 [hereinafter S. REP. No. 225].
10. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 9, at 96 ("[A]n organization convicted of executing a
fraudulent scheme might be directed to operate that part of the business in a manner that was not
fraudulent.").
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Commission provided for a number of sanctions aimed at corporate re-
form and specific deterrence. These include: (1) mandatory publicity by
a corporate offender about its offense to encourage heightened monitor-
ing of offender behavior in private relationships;11 (2) a court-ordered
law compliance program where a firm having fifty or more employees has
not adopted such a program before sentencing; 12 and (3) additional law
compliance measures where the nature of a firm's offense indicates that
changes to reduce the likelihood of future criminal conduct are needed.I3
Given their elaborate nature in comparison with a simple order to pay
a fine, there may be unusual judicial administration costs associated with
these innovative sanctions. However, these appear to be costs that Con-
gress intended sentencing courts and convicted firms to bear in the inter-
est of reducing corporate crime and preventing repeat offenses.
Furthermore, since sentencing courts can require corporate probationers
to pay for many of the expensive components of sanction administration,
most, if not all, of the costs of innovative sanctions can be placed on
corporate offenders, rather than on sentencing courts or government
agencies. 14
Even if some costs of changed offender behavior (for example, the
business impact of probation terms that preclude certain sales tactics) are
significant, the notion of imposing exceptional burdens and costs on con-
victed parties to insure that they avoid future crimes is not peculiar to
corporate sentencing. Sentencing courts impose many costly probation
restrictions on individuals to prevent further offenses and to encourage
offender rehabilitation.' 5 These added burdens on individual probation-
ers constitute a fair complement to the criminal behavior leading to sen-
tencing and a necessary cost to further sentencing goals that courts
11. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8DI.4(a).
12. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, §§ 8Dl.l(a)(3), 8D1.4(c).
13. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, §§ 8DI.1(4)-(6), 8D1.4(c).
14. Where the development or enforcement of innovative sanctions requires special expertise or
monitoring of offender conduct, sentencing courts can shift associated burdens to offenders by im-
posing probation terms that provide for the appointment of experts to aid the court and can require
offenders to pay costs associated with these appointments.
15. Many of the probation conditions authorized for individuals sentenced under the Sentenc-
ing Reform Act and recommended by the United States Sentencing Commission involve limitations
on individual conduct that will entail losses of income or costly conduct by probationers. These
include restrictions on work activities, required support payments to family members, and mandated
community service. See 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(1), (5), (6), (13); U.S.S.G., supra note 1, §§ 5B1.4(a)(4),
(b)(21), (b)(22).
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cannot achieve in other ways. Similar considerations justify special pre-
ventive demands on corporate probationers.
II. REMEDIAL SANCTIONS
The new Guidelines embrace ambitious remedial goals. Except where
determinations of victim injuries will significantly delay or otherwise im-
pair the sentencing process, the Guidelines instruct sentencing courts to
order restitution for a wide range of offenses. Restitution orders can pro-
vide for deferred payments if a convicted firm lacks the resources to
make immediate restitution. Where a sentencing court chooses to with-
hold a restitution order, but believes that with greater information about
an offense individual victims may be able to appreciate their status and
seek civil remedies, the court can order a convicted corporation to pro-
vide notices about its offense to probable victims. Finally, where the
identity of crime victims is unclear or offense damages are neither pres-
ently identifiable physical injuries nor pecuniary losses, a sentencing
court can fashion remedial orders obligating a convicted corporation to
take actions likely to prevent or reduce harm stemming from an offense.
Similarly, where a convicted organization possesses knowledge, facilities,
or skills that uniquely qualify organization personnel to repair damage
resulting from an offense, a sentencing court can order the corporation to
engage in remedial community service.
A. Immediate Restitution
A criminal restitution order requires an offender to make a monetary
payment to a crime victim with the aim of "making the victim whole for
the harm caused" by an offense. 6 Restitution is an important corporate
sentencing objective for several reasons. 7 Restitution by convicted cor-
porations reduces the impact of crimes on victims."8 Several considera-
16. William W. Wilkins, Jr., Sentencing Guidelines for Organizational Defendants, 3 FED. SEN-
TENCING REP. 118, 119 (1990); cf. Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 46 (1986) (for bankruptcy law
purposes, restitution is deemed part of a criminal penalty, not compensation for victim losses).
17. See generally Alan T. Harland, Monetary Remedies for the Victims of Crime: Assessing the
Role of the Criminal Courts, 30 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 52, 119-26 (1982).
18. See Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 416 (1990) (federal restitution sentences are
imposed to restore victims to the positions they occupied prior to offenses); S. REP. No. 532, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2515 (the purpose of restitution is to
"restore the victim to his or her prior state of well-being"). But see Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36,
41 (1986) (restitution payments by a criminal offender are aimed at rehabilitating the offender, not at
compensating the victim).
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tions support the furtherance of this objective through criminal rather
than civil processes. First, the policy rationales that support criminaliz-
ing certain types of conduct and related government efforts to minimize
physical injuries and property losses by preventing crimes also justify
state pursuit of victim compensation once prevention has failed. 9 Sec-
ond, the state often bears some responsibility for failing to prevent or
stop crimes; restitution serves as a form of substitute service to victims in
cases where prevention and deterrence have failed.20 Third, the state has
an interest in maintaining the security of property and public confidence
in the ability of private parties to keep rewards for past achievements.
Restitution awards offset arbitrary, criminal interference with personal
fulfillment and indirectly support public confidence in a wide variety of
merit-based processes.21 Fourth, where a corporate offense produces ille-
gal gains or losses to competitors, the state has an interest in restitution
that will restore the competitive equilibrium that existed before the com-
mission of the offense.22 By depriving offenders of illegal gains and com-
pensating their competitors for offense-related losses, the state can help
restore the relative resources and competitive abilities of these parties
and insure that offenses do not skew subsequent market discipline and
product or service availability. Fifth, the use of criminal proceedings for
the administration of both penal sanctions and compensatory restitution
provides an efficient means to avoid duplication of procedural steps that
19. The same considerations that justify criminalization and deterrence of specific offense con-
duct will often justify public efforts to reduce the impact of such conduct once it occurs. For exam-
ple, the law prohibits antitrust offenses primarily to deter conduct that will impair competition.
Where an offense such as price fixing has skewed normal competitive equilibria, compensatory pay-
ments can restore both offender and victim to approximately the competitive position that they
would have occupied had the offense not occurred. While restitution payments may not perfectly
restore victims and offenders to this position, even a roughly accurate restitution award will achieve
a closer approximation of normal competitive results than inaction. Hence, restitution serves many
of the same goals as crime deterrence and prevention.
20. See CHARLES F. ABEL & FRANK H. MARSH, PUNISHMENT AND RESTITUTION: A RESTI-
TUTIONARY APPROACH TO CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL 4-5 (1984). This view of the government's
partial responsibility for corporate offenses may be particularly appropriate in heavily regulated
fields where the scope of government monitoring and enforcement often correlate with crime levels.
For example, the deregulation policies and the associated reductions in savings and loan oversight
initiated by the Reagan administration probably explain some of the subsequent rise in fraudulent
business practices by savings and loan executives.
21. Id. at 94-96.
22. While competitive impacts from illegal conduct are most commonly associated with anti-
trust offenses, they can also arise from other crimes. For example, a fraud that produces increased
sales could give an organization a significant advantage over its competitors if the fraud gains are not
disgorged.
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might result if compensatory victim recoveries could only be obtained
through civil proceedings following criminal prosecutions.2 3 This justifi-
cation is particularly important in connection with corporate prosecu-
tions because victim losses will often figure in corporate fine setting and,
consequently, sentencing courts will regularly make the loss determina-
tions necessary to fashion restitution orders.24 Sixth, because prosecutors
can threaten to seek harsh sanctions such as large fines or restrictive pro-
bation sentences, managers of corporate offenders may decide to avoid
these sanctions by agreeing to broader restitution arrangements under
plea bargains than they would accept under civil settlements. Federal
law presently recognizes the legitimacy of such broad restitution agree-
ments by making restitution obligations agreed to in plea bargains en-
forceable even where the same type of restitution would be beyond court
authority to order directly." Finally, federal prosecutors may have
greater resources to prove offender misconduct and related harm than
individual plaintiffs can muster in civil damage proceedings.
Beyond serving these functions related to victim compensation, restitu-
tion sentencing can further several other goals. Viewed as punishment,
restitution entails unpleasant consequences for convicted corporations
whose agents have interfered with victim activities, while setting the
amount of punishment equal to the harm inflicted.26 Restitution sentenc-
ing promises predictable costs to offenders that should encourage firm
managers to internalize victim losses and shape crime prevention activi-
ties in light of those losses. Restitution sentences also create well-tailored
deterrents. They threaten crime consequences scaled under the predict-
able principle of punishment equal to (or enhanced by) the scope of vic-
tim losses. Besides being easily understood, this principle for scaling
criminal sanctions may be less controversial in our pluralist society than
other notions of just deserts or appropriate deterrents.27 Finally, restitu-
tion can aid in reforming a convicted corporation by forcing top manag-
23. While the collateral estoppel effect of a criminal conviction might make subsequent civil
proceedings less substantively demanding, some procedural duplication would be unavoidable. This
duplication would include the need to gain jurisdiction over the participants, assemble them, and
empanel another jury. It might also include some duplication of testimony as individual plaintiffs
sought to identify themselves as victims of the defendant's illegal acts.
24. A court must consider pecuniary losses caused intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly by
corporate personnel when setting corporate sentences, unless the calculation of these losses will un-
duly complicate or prolong the sentencing process. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8C2.4(a)(3), (c).
25. 18 U.S.C. § 3663(aX3) (1988).
26. See ABEL & MARSH, supra note 20, at 18-19.
27. See id. at 94-96.
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ers to face the economic hardships created by criminal misconduct and
to defend the misconduct and related corporate actions before sharehold-
ers who, as residuary claimants in the firm, are most likely to suffer from
restitution payments.
Expanding on earlier victim compensation statutes, the Sentencing
Guidelines mandate restitution for all federal offenses, except where a
sentencing court "determines that the complication and prolongation of
the sentencing process resulting from the fashioning of a restitution re-
quirement outweighs the need to provide restitution to any victims
through the criminal process."28 Restitution is a sentencing objective in-
dependent of punishment. Hence, if a convicted organization can pay
restitution, a sentencing court should order restitution payments regard-
less of the degree of organizational culpability underlying an offense or
the nature of any other sanctions imposed.29
The Guidelines provide for two types of restitution arrangements. For
offenses under Title 18 of the United States Code and certain air piracy
offenses,30 the Guidelines require restitution orders in the form specified
in the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982.31 For other offenses,
the Guidelines require sentencing courts to impose restitution obligations
as probation terms.32
The government can enforce a restitution order in the same manner as
a fine33 or a judgment in a civil action. Victims can also enforce a restitu-
tion order in the same manner as a civil judgment. The Sentencing
Guidelines expand the enforcement options for restitution orders, how-
ever, by authorizing sentencing courts to make the payment of restitution
a condition of probation, thereby threatening convicted corporations
with probation violation sanctions including resentencing for failure to
pay restitution.34
While some aspects of restitution sentencing under the Guidelines sim-
ply incorporate prior practices, many features are new and unique to cor-
porate sentencing. New restitution issues raised by the Guidelines
include the discretionary power of sentencing courts to withhold restitu-
28. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8Bl.l(b).
29. Wilkins, supra note 16, at 119.
30. These air piracy offenses arise under 49 U.S.C. §§ 1472 (h), (i), (j), (n) (1988).
31. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663, 3664 (1988).
32. US.S.G., supra note 1, § 8BI.l(a)(2).
33. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3661-3665 (1988).
34. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1, §§ 8D1.l(a)(1), 8D1.5.
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tion, the types of victims eligible for compensation, the principles for de-
termining the compensation due to each victim, and standards for
ascertaining when restitution sentencing is too burdensome and a restitu-
tion order should be withheld.
1. Judicial Discretion Regarding Restitution Sentencing
The Sentencing Guidelines do not clearly delineate the discretion that
sentencing courts have to withhold restitution sentences. The Guidelines
appear to make restitution orders or equivalent probation terms
mandatory, except where a sentencing court determines that a convicted
organization has already made full restitution or that the fashioning of a
restitution order would be exceptionally burdensome.35 However, the
Guidelines mandate restitution to the extent that restitution is authorized
under the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982.36 Under that Act,
sentencing courts have the discretion to withhold restitution orders based
on criteria other than the difficulty of fashioning a restitution order.37 It
remains unclear whether this combination of mandatory guideline lan-
guage referring to discretionary statutory language produces a
mandatory or discretionary restitution standard for sentencing courts.
If, as one court has concluded in an analogous context, 38 the Guide-
lines on corporate restitution sentences are viewed as mere cross-refer-
ences to the earlier Victim and Witness Protection Act, sentencing courts
have broad discretion to withhold restitution sentences. However, if the
new restitution guidelines for corporate offenders are seen as attempts by
the Sentencing Commission to limit court discretion and further victim
restitution in all circumstances except where the fashioning of a restitu-
tion order will be exceptionally burdensome, then this type of sentencing
burden constitutes the only legitimate ground for refusing to require a
corporate offender to pay restitution.
It seems clear that the Sentencing Commission intended the latter in-
terpretation to prevail. The Guidelines provide that a sentencing court
35. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8B1.l(a) (providing that a sentencing court "shall" compel
restitution, except under certain enumerated circumstances).
36. Id.
37. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663(b) (providing that sentencing courts "may" order restitution for cer-
tain types of injuries).
38. See United States v. Owens, 901 F.2d 1457, 1459 (8th Cir. 1990) (finding that § 5E4.1,
concerning restitutionary sentences for individuals, merely cross-references the Victim and Witness
Protection Act and does not, despite its mandatory terms, impose an obligation on sentencing courts
to order restitution).
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"shall" compel restitution if it was "authorized" by the Victim and Wit-
ness Protection Act of 1982 or would have been so authorized if the of-
fense under sentencing had fallen within the limited range of offenses
addressed by the Act.39 The Commission therefore required restitution
except where the Act precluded it. Where restitution was authorized,
but discretionary under the Act, the Commission's guidelines now make
restitution mandatory. This approach retains the specific discretion lim-
its in the Victim and Witness Protection Act, but precludes sentencing
courts from injecting other grounds for withholding restitution.
The Commission confirmed this interpretation of its restitution stan-
dards in commentary introducing the new Sentencing Guidelines. The
Commission stated that it expected sentencing courts to impose restitu-
tion obligations in all cases where the formulation of those obligations
was practical." In addition, the Commission promulgated its restitution
standards as judicially binding sentencing guidelines rather than advisory
policy statements, despite having the option to choose the latter ap-
proach. It seems doubtful that the Commission would adopt guideline
language mandating restitution while simultaneously intending that sen-
tencing courts be able to withhold restitution sentences based on their
own criteria.
A final question, then, is whether the Commission had the authority to
issue restitution standards binding federal courts to the degree just de-
scribed. At least one commentator has suggested that the promulgation
of mandatory restitution standards exceeds the statutory charter of the
Sentencing Commission. 41 The statute creating the Commission recog-
nizes its authority to develop "general policy statements" (i.e., advisory
standards) regarding restitution orders, while particularly authorizing
the Commission to issue judicially binding guidelines for sentences like
fines, probation, or imprisonment.42 Thus, because the Commission's
statutory charter does not directly address its authority to issue sentenc-
ing guidelines concerning restitution sentences, the Commission's pro-
39. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8B1.1(a).
40. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1, ch. 8 (Introductory comment.).
41. See Victoria Toensing, Statutory and Policy Arguments in Favor of Judicial Discretion in
Corporate Sentencing, 3 FED. SENTENCING REP. 145, 145 (1990). Cf THOMAS W. HUTCHISON &
DAVID YELLEN, FEDERAL SENTENCING LAW AND PRACTICE 340 (1989) (noting that the Sentenc-
ing Commission's guideline on restitution sentences for individual defendants is not a guideline con-
templated by the Commission's statutory charter).
42. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2)(A) (1988) (restitution) with 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1)(A)
(1988) (other sentences).
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mulgation of standards mandating restitution in certain circumstances
arguably exceeds its statutory authority. 3
However, this analysis ignores two alternate sources of Commission
authority to issue binding sentencing guidelines regarding restitution
sentences. First, the Commission's statutory charter grants the Commis-
sion the authority to promulgate guidelines "for use of a sentencing court
in determining the sentence to be imposed in a criminal case," including
guidelines that address the proper circumstances for imposing probation,
fines, or imprisonment, the amount or duration of those sentences,
whether imprisonment should accompany a term of supervised release,
and whether multiple sentences should run concurrently or consecu-
tively.44 The enumeration of specific topics which the Commission was
directed to address in sentencing guidelines did not preclude it from issu-
ing guidelines on other topics related to determining the sentence to be
imposed in a criminal case. The Commission's authority to promulgate
sentencing guidelines concerning restitution sentences is supported by
this general grant of authority to specify standards for determining
sentences.
Alternatively, even if it is assumed that Congress limited the authority
of the Commission to the issuance of sentencing guidelines on the specific
topics mentioned above, the authority to specify standards for restitution
is present in the Commission's authority to issue binding sentencing
guidelines regarding probation sentences. The Sentencing Reform Act
recognizes that probation conditions imposing restitution obligations are
a legitimate type of probation sentence.4 5 The Commission's authority to
determine sentencing guidelines for probation sentences presumably in-
cludes the authority to promulgate guidelines for a particular type of pro-
bation sentence-i.e., probation sentences compelling restitution.
By mandating restitution to the full extent allowed by the Victim and
Witness Protection Act, the Commission has chosen one of a range of
restitution sentencing approaches which it had the authority to endorse
as part of its authority over probation standards. Admittedly, this choice
43. See Toensing, supra note 41, at 145.
44. 28 U.S.C. § 994(aXI). Of course, the vesting of these broad rule-making powers in the
Commission must comport with constitutional limits on the delegation of legislative power and on
the proper functions of a judicial branch body such as the Commission. The Commission's authority
over individual sentencing standards has been upheld in the face of such challenges. See Mistretta v.
United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989). See generally Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion:
The New Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883 (1990).
45. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3563(a)(2), (b)(3).
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constrains the pre-existing discretion of sentencing courts to withhold
restitution for reasons beyond those specified by the Sentencing Commis-
sion. However, this lessening of judicial discretion over restitution sen-
tencing and corresponding reductions in restitution disparities from case
to case and court to court should further Congress' general goal of im-
posing determinant sentencing standards through the creation of the Sen-
tencing Commission and its authorization to issue binding sentencing
guidelines.
2. Eligible Victims
Ideally, the range of victims eligible for restitution under corporate
criminal sentences should depend on the societal interests underlying res-
titution. Generally, restitution sentences attempt to stabilize social activ-
ities and shield them from the disruptive effects of criminal conduct.46
This objective suggests that restitution should be coextensive with the
harm fairly attributed to an organization's criminal conduct.
One implication of this principle is that the form of the victim should
play little or no role in restitution sentencing. Nonhuman entities af-
fected by criminal conduct can suffer disruption of business or other ac-
tivities to the same extent as individuals engaging in the same activities.
Hence, nonhuman actors such as corporations4' and governmental agen-
cies" can qualify for restitution payments along with human victims.
Furthermore, when a corporate insurer of a human victim has alreadyprovided compensation for physical injuries or property damage flowing
46. See ABEL & MARSH, supra note 20, at 161.
47. See United States v. Durham, 755 F.2d 511, 513 (6th Cir. 1985).
48. See, eg., United States v. Hand, 863 F.2d 1100, 1103 (3d Cir. 1988) (government was a
victim entitled to restitution where offender, sitting as a juror, made illegal contact with a criminal
defendant, resulting in additional expense, salaries, and witness fees expended on further criminal
proceedings); United States v. House, 808 F.2d 508 (7th Cir. 1986) (government was a victim enti-
tled to restitution for autopsy, funeral, and burial expenses when defendant killed fellow prisoner);
United States v. Ruffen, 780 F.2d 1493, 1496 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 479 U.S. 963 (1986) (county
social services agency was entitled to restitution for $50,000 in welfare benefits illegally obtained by
the defendant).
Restitution to government agencies will be particularly important for offenses affecting govern-
ment procurement, In these cases, the amounts at stake are often enormous. For example, where
suppliers of turbines used in a government dam construction project engage in price fixing, the of-
fending firms may be liable for millions of dollars in overpayments by the government. Firms that
ignore safety obligations may be in even worse positions. For example, where personnel of a military
supplier intentionally fail to inspect a 15c bolt that later breaks causing a $30 million aircraft to
crash, the firm's restitution obligations may extend to the full value of the aircraft. See Special
Report, supra note 3, at 239.
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from an offense, the insurer is treated as a crime victim for purposes of
restitution payments.4 9
The proximity of injuries to offense conduct that is necessary to qualify
a party as a victim for restitution purposes is not addressed in the Guide-
lines. Certainly, restitution should extend to victims who suffer identifi-
able damage as a direct, immediate consequence of criminal conduct.
However, victims whose injuries are more remote from an offense also
may deserve restitution where criminal conduct initiates a sequence of
events that results in harm and where no independently initiated act con-
stitutes a more significant cause of the harm.
One consideration that may be important in assessing the proper scope
of restitution for remote injuries is whether a type of harm (or at least the
mechanism of harm) was foreseeable to the offender at the time of the
offense. If restitution is primarily a means to insure that corporations
internalize crime costs-thereby encouraging corporate managers to in-
crease their crime prevention efforts when further efforts will tend to
avoid more costly offense harms-then compensating unforeseeable
harms through restitution is not justified. While this approach might
encourage a greater margin of preventive behavior than restitution based
on foreseeable harms alone, there is no reason to expect that corporations
would properly direct this extra effort or that it would be sufficient to
prevent unforeseeable harms. This follows because corporate managers
will generally be equally unaware of the need or means to prevent unfore-
seeable harms. Hence, if the main goal of criminal restitution by corpo-
rate defendants is to induce organizations to internalize crime costs and
gauge the need for greater crime prevention efforts, courts should ex-
clude unforeseeable harms from restitution sentences.
This view of restitution is flawed for several reasons. The social stabili-
zation purpose of restitution will be equally furthered by restitution to
victims of foreseeable and unforeseeable harms. The disruption to a
crime victim that restitution will offset will be approximately the same
regardless of whether the victim's harm or the mechanism by which it
occurred were foreseeable to the offender at the time of the offense. Fur-
thermore, to the extent that the line between foreseeable and unforesee-
able harms is ambiguous and evolving, holding corporate offenders
accountable for all harm resulting from their offenses places the burden
49. 18 U.S.C. § 3663(eX). When a court orders restitution payments to both victims and in-
surers who have compensated victims, the victims must receive complete restitution before any pay-
ments to insurers are made. Id.
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on firms to adopt optimal means to predict the harmful consequences of
corporate conduct and to take cost effective measures to prevent offenses.
The characteristics of crime victims warranting restitution may be sub-
ject to several additional limitations. One key question is whether courts
must limit restitution to harm resulting from conduct supporting a con-
viction or whether, once a conviction is obtained, restitution can extend
to other instances of similar conduct not within the proven offense, pro-
vided that this additional conduct and the injuries it caused are estab-
lished by a preponderance of the evidence at sentencing. These models of
restitution present a difficult choice between the efficiency of resolving all
compensation for similar conduct in a single proceeding and the potential
unfairness to the defendant in applying a criminal restitution sentence to
conduct that was never proven to be criminal under normal liability
standards.
In Hughey v. United States,50 the Supreme Court faced a choice be-
tween these two restitution models. Hughey involved a defendant who
pled guilty to one count of unauthorized use of a credit card in exchange
for prosecutors' agreement to drop two further counts of unauthorized
credit card use and three counts of theft by a Postal Service employee.51
During the defendant's presentencing hearing, prosecutors offered evi-
dence that he had stolen and used twenty-one credit cards. Although the
use of these cards was not covered by the defendant's guilty plea, prose-
cutors sought restitution for bank losses related to the use of all twenty-
one cards.5 2 The sentencing court ordered restitution for all these losses
and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.53
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the Victim
and Witness Protection Act authorizes sentencing courts to compel de-
fendants such as Hughey to pay restitution for injuries stemming from
conduct that is not the basis for a conviction or guilty plea. In conclud-
ing that the Act does not authorize such restitution orders, the Court
criticized an "open-ended approach to restitution" that would expand
restitution sentences beyond those supported by a straightforward inter-
pretation of the Victim and Witness Protection Act.54 The Court was
unpersuaded by arguments that this approach would make the scope of
50. 495 U.S. 411 (1990).
51. Id. at 413.
52. Id. at 414.
53. Id.
54. See i at 416-20.
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federal restitution orders a function of charging and plea bargaining deci-
sions by federal prosecutors that often have little relation to the scope of
victim injuries.55
The Guidelines require corporate restitution sentences to the extent
that restitution is authorized under the Victim and Witness Protection
Act, except that mandatory restitution is not restricted to the few types
of offenses addressed by that Act.56 Hence, the limitation recognized in
Hughey as a constraint on restitution under the Victim and Witness Pro-
tection Act also applies to mandatory restitution sentencing under the
Guidelines.
While the Court's limitation of mandatory restitution to proven of-
fenses somewhat narrows the scope of mandatory restitution sentences, it
still leaves several key questions unanswered. For example, is restitution
limited to harm caused by conduct that was a necessary element of a
proven offense or can restitution extend to actions that surrounded an
offense, but were not required elements of the offense? Consider the fol-
lowing case. Employees of a corporation illegally transport hazardous
wastes, dispose of the wastes on another party's property, and thereby
reduce the value of the affected property. The defendant corporation
pleads guilty to one count of illegal transportation of hazardous wastes.
Can a federal court order restitution for the reduction in value of the
affected property even though the offense for which the defendant was
convicted was completed when the waste transportation began and proof
of that offense did not require proof of the dumping that produced the
property owner's losses?
In United States v. Mounts,57 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals gave
an affirmative answer to a similar question, reasoning that the class of
victims eligible for restitution under the Victim and Witness Protection
Act includes all persons within the range of risks addressed by the statute
violated by a defendant.5 " In the hypothetical case above, unauthorized
waste disposal following illegal transportation of hazardous wastes prob-
ably was a type of harm Congress expected to prevent through criminal-
55. Prosecutors typically choose to withhold or drop particular counts because of concern over
their ability to prove necessary crime elements or because they are seeking to induce defendants to
plead guilty to other charges and thereby avoid a trial. Under either motivation, victims of offenses
not leading to a conviction will have no basis for criminal restitution due to reasons unrelated to the
scope of their injuries or their ability to gain compensation through other means. See id. at 420-21.
56. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8Bl.l(a).
57. 793 F.2d 125 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1019 (1986).
58. Id. at 128.
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izing waste transportation without proper permits. Hence, injured
property owners such as the one in this hypothetical would be proper
recipients of restitution under the zone of risk test adopted in Mounts.
Under this approach, the goals of the criminal statute violated define the
range of victims who qualify for restitution, rather than the particular
conduct forming the basis for a conviction or guilty plea.
A narrower reading limiting restitution to those persons harmed by
conduct proven to establish an offense would severely restrict the reach
of restitution sentencing. Many crimes, like the hazardous waste trans-
portation offense in the example above, can be completed with little or no
immediate harm. The behavior constituting the offense is criminalized
because of its propensity to result in harm, but harm need not be shown
to establish the offense. If courts limit restitution to the harmful conse-
quences of conduct that must be shown to establish an offense, little com-
pensable harm would ever be identified except where harmful
consequences are an element of an offense.
While it is inappropriate to limit restitution to immediate conse-
quences of essential offense conduct, courts may find it problematic to
use a zone of risk standard like that applied in Mounts. Judicial esti-
mates of the range of hazards that Congress sought to prevent when it
enacted a specific criminal statute will be highly speculative and likely to
produce restitution orders that vary considerably across factually similar
cases.
A preferable approach would be to extend restitution to all victims
who suffer harm as a direct consequence of either offense conduct or fur-
ther defendant actions related to offense conduct. 59 Thus, in the hazard-
ous waste handling case above, the owner of the affected property would
be eligible for restitution because the defendant's illegal transportation of
hazardous wastes led directly to the dumping on the victim's property.
Similarly, restitution would be proper if the dumping were concealed for
some time and the property owner suffered crop losses due to the pres-
ence of the illegally transported waste. Even though a significant period
had passed, the property owner would be eligible for restitution for his
crop losses because those losses would not have occurred but for the ille-
gal waste hauling and there was no other independent action that was a
59. Cf United States v. Durham, 755 F.2d 511, 513 (6th Cir. 1985) (for purposes of the Victim
and Witness Protection Act, a "'victim' [is] a person who suffered injury as a result of the defend-
ant's actions that surround the commission of the offense, regardless of whether the actions are
elements of the offense charged").
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more significant cause of the victim's loss. By contrast, the property
owner might not qualify for restitution under the Mounts standard be-
cause crop losses resulting from illegal waste handling and subsequent
dumping may not have been within the range of risks that Congress
sought to diminish through legislation criminalizing unauthorized trans-
portation of hazardous waste.
More remote victim injuries flowing from an offense might warrant
restitution even if those injuries were not a direct result of offense con-
duct. For example, if the defendant in the above waste transportation
example stole a car to escape from the dumping scene and damaged the
car while fleeing, is the owner of the car a victim of the illegal waste
transportation offense for restitution purposes? The issue under the Vic-
tim and Witness Protection Act is whether the car owner is a victim of
the offense or of independent defendant conduct.
There are several reasons why a sentencing court might consider dam-
age to a car under these circumstances to be an injury stemming from the
underlying waste handling offense. First, the defendant may have
planned, if threatened with detection, to steal a car to escape from the
waste disposal scene and thereby avoid detection for his waste transpor-
tation offense. A common plan such as this linking the offense and the
injury-inducing conduct may be sufficient to justify restitution. Second,
the car owner might be considered a victim for restitution purposes be-
cause the conduct that damaged the car was aimed at concealing the
defendant's offense. Under this approach, damages warranting restitu-
tion include those stemming from efforts to conceal an offense. Finally, a
court might consider the car owner a victim for restitution purposes sim-
ply because the damage to the car occurred through an uninterrupted
series of events that included the defendant's offense.' Under this test,
any injury directly caused by an uninterrupted sequence of defendant
conduct that includes an offense makes the injured party a victim for
restitution purposes.61
It is tempting in this context to adopt causation formalisms from other
legal contexts to determine how far offender responsibility and restitution
payments should extend. Two extensively analyzed causation models are
the tests for proximate causation governing negligence recoveries62 and
60. 793 F.2d at 127 (adopting a broad definition of "victim" articulated in its earlier decision in
Durham).
61. Id. at 128.
62. See KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS 263-321 (5th ed. 1984).
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causation standards used to gauge the scope of offender culpability in
criminal cases.63 Yet, as well considered as these standards may be in
their own domains, they are crafted for different purposes than causation
tests governing restitution. For example, limiting defendant responsibil-
ity for certain harms under proximate cause standards serves to adjust
the actual costs of negligent conduct to those the tortfeasor could have
anticipated and avoided. It thereby encourages parties to make this same
assessment without concern that modest errors in comparing prevention
costs with likely harms may produce enormous losses. By contrast, cau-
sation standards under the Model Penal Code serve to gauge defendant
culpability by rating offenses based on the range of consequences know-
ingly, intentionally, or recklessly inflicted.
Causation tests in restitution analyses serve a different purpose. Given
that a defendant has committed an offense, a causation analysis is aimed
at identifying the losses resulting from the offense that the offender
should bear. If this analysis begins from the assumption that the defend-
ant's illegal conduct should not have occurred, then a strong case can be
made for a rule extending restitution to all harms that only resulted be-
cause of the forbidden act. The victims suffering these losses are typi-
cally less responsible for their infliction than the criminal actor. As to
many if not all those losses, the actor will have had the sole opportunity
to avoid them. Furthermore, forced restitution payments for all these
losses would reinforce the public's legitimate expectations that societal
actors will not engage in offenses or, where they do, they will bear the full
consequences of restoring victims to the condition that would have pre-
vailed without the offense. These considerations all support a causation
analysis for restitution purposes that extends payments to all losses
which would not have resulted but for the defendant's offense and related
conduct which the defendant would not have undertaken but for the
offense.64
3. Compensable Injuries
The Guidelines require courts to order restitution for types of injuries
compensable under the Victim and Witness Protection Act.65 In general,
63. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03.
64. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIME LAWS, FINAL REPORT 31-
32 (1971) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
65. The Sentencing Guidelines require restitution to the extent that it would have been author-
ized under the earlier Victim and Witness Protection Act. To the extent that the Act did not corn-
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compensable injuries under the Act are limited to pecuniary damage
traceable to an offense. Restitution amounts are reduced by compensa-
tion already paid to victims prior to sentencing.66 Where a third party
(for example, an insurance company) compensates a victim prior to sen-
tencing, that third party is considered the victim for purposes of restitu-
tion sentencing and can recover sums paid to the victim up to the amount
the victim would have recovered.67 Conversely, amounts paid as restitu-
tion reduce the amounts a compensated victim can recover in later fed-
eral or state civil proceedings.68
The Victim and Witness Protection Act confines injuries subject to res-
titution to several narrow categories. Restitution for these same types of
injuries is mandated under the Guidelines. However, as discussed below,
sentencing courts may have discretionary authority to order restitution
for broader types of injury.
a. Damage to or Loss of Property
When an offense involves damage to or loss of property, the Victim
and Witness Protection Act authorizes a restitution order requiring re-
turn of the affected property. If return is impossible, impractical, or in-
adequate to make the victim whole, a sentencing court may require
further restitution payments equal to the greater of (a) the difference be-
tween the value of the property on the date of damage or loss and the
value, as of the date of return, of any part of the property returned or
(b) the value of the property on the date of sentencing and the value, as
of the date of return, of any part of the property returned.69 By using the
greater of these two property loss figures, the restitution computation
pensate certain types of injuries, restitution for those injuries was not authorized. Hence, similar
restitution is not required under the Guidelines. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8B1.l(a).
For an overview of types of restitution authorized under the Victim and Witness Protection Act,
see John F. Wagner, Jr., Who is a "Victim"So As to Be Entitled to Restitution Under the Victim and
Witness Protection Act, 108 A.L.R. FED. 828 (1992).
66. 18 U.S.C. § 3663(e)(1). This implies, however, that the sufficiency of a prior civil damage
award to make a victim whole may be reassessed by a sentencing court considering a restitution
order. The amount of compensation necessary to satisfy federal restitution statutes may differ from
satisfactory compensation under state tort standards or other civil measures.
67. 18 U.S.C. § 3663(e)(1). However, before an insurer can receive any amount of restitution,
the victim must first be fully compensated. Id.
68. 18 U.S.C. § 36 63(eX2). It is unclear whether amounts paid as restitution will also reduce
the base harm figure used to compute treble damages where such damages are available to civil
plaintiffs. See Special Report, supra note 3, at 239 (suggesting that restitution sentences may reduce
treble damages).
69. 18 U.S.C. § 3663(b)(1).
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effectively places the risk of rising property values in the period between
an offense and sentencing on the defendant. While the restitution stan-
dard in the Victim and Witness Protection Act is drafted in terms of the
"return" of property, where property is damaged while never leaving the
control of its owner, the value on the date of return equals the value of
the property immediately following the damage caused by the
defendant.7 °
b. Bodily Injury or Death
When an offense results in bodily injury to a victim, compensable ex-
penses under the Victim and Witness Protection Act include amounts
paid for medical expenses and related professional care (including psy-
chiatric and psychological care), costs of physical therapy, occupational
therapy and rehabilitation, and lost wages due to the injury.71
When an offense results in death, compensable expenses include fu-
neral costs and related expenses.72
c. Excluded Damage
Restitution standards in the Victim and Witness Protection Act deny
restitution for several important types of victim damage. For example,
almost all consequential damages are excluded. A victim can recover
neither lost business income due to the unavailability of assets damaged
through criminal conduct 73 nor expenses incurred in recovering stolen
property.74 Also, except for medical expenses and lost wages, a victim
cannot recover losses due to physical injuries. Future wages lost due to
physical injuries are unrecoverable if their computation with sufficient
certainty to fashion a restitution order would unduly complicate the sen-
tencing process.75
Several other types of damage also are excluded from restitution or-
ders under the Victim and Witness Protection Act apparently because
the measurement of these types of damage would be speculative or diffi-
cult. These excluded damages include property losses not measurable in
70. See United States v. Tyler, 767 F.2d 1350, 1352 (9th Cir. 1985).
71. 18 U.S.C. § 3663(b)(2).
72. 18 U.S.C. § 3663(b)(3).
73. See, eg., United States v. Bengimina, 699 F. Supp. 214 (W.D. Mo. 1988); United States v.
Trettenaro, 601 F. Supp. 183, 185 (D. Colo. 1985).
74. See Trettenaro, 601 F. Supp. at 185.
75. See United States v. Fountain, 768 F.2d 790, 802 (7th Cir.), reh'g denied, 777 F.2d 345
(1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1124 (1986).
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pecuniary terms, environmental harm not reflected in property losses,76
recoveries for pain and suffering from physical injuries, and losses due to
altered victim conduct following criminal behavior.
d. Court Authority to Order Restitution for Broader Harm
The new Sentencing Guidelines do not indicate whether sentencing
courts have the discretion to order restitution for types of damage be-
yond those discussed above. While the Guidelines require sentencing
courts to order restitution under circumstances where the Victim and
Witness Protection Act authorizes restitution payments, the Guidelines
do not include a negative admonition "and in no other circumstances."
Courts may have some flexibility to award restitution beyond those types
authorized under the Victim and Witness Protection Act. This flexibility
is present if either the Guidelines mandating specific forms of restitution
do not bar further types of restitution, or, contrary to my previous con-
clusion, the restitution provisions of the Guidelines represent no more
than advisory policy statements that leave sentencing courts with discre-
tion to act differently.
If sentencing courts do possess this type of discretion under the Guide-
lines, then their ability to order restitution is limited only by statutory
constraints on restitution. The Sentencing Reform Act appears to au-
thorize sentencing courts to impose broader types of restitution obliga-
tions under probation conditions than courts could previously compel
under the Victim and Witness Protection Act." The Sentencing Reform
Act grants a sentencing court the authority to require a convicted corpo-
ration to meet "such... conditions as the court may impose," subject
only to requirements that these conditions reasonably relate to federal
sentencing goals and involve only those deprivations of liberty and prop-
erty that are reasonably necessary to meet those objectives.7" The legisla-
tive history of the Sentencing Reform Act indicates that the Act was
viewed as granting courts the authority to order previously unauthorized
types of restitution.79 For example, Congress felt that sentencing courts
could properly impose probation terms mandating restitution for victim
76. For thorough analyses of environmental losses beyond property devaluation and of means
to measure those losses in restitution proceedings, see Kathryn C. MacDonald, The Recovery of
Restoration Costs: An Analytical Synthesis of Common-Law Property Damages, Restitution, and Nat-
ural Resource Damages Under CERCLA, 5 TUL. ENvTL. L.J. 255 (1991).
77. See S. Rae. No. 225, supra note 9, at 96.
78. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3563(b), (b)(21).
79. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 9, at 96.
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costs beyond medical expenses and other amounts payable under the Vic-
tim and Witness Protection Act.80 Consequently, if the Guidelines do
not constrain the exercise of this court authority, sentencing courts ap-
pear to have discretionary authority to require restitution for all reason-
ably ascertainable victim losses from federal offenses.
4. Complication and Prolongation of the Sentencing Process as
Grounds for Withholding Restitution
The Guidelines provide that a sentencing court need not impose resti-
tution where the court "determines that the complication and prolonga-
tion of the sentencing process resulting from the fashioning of a
restitution requirement outweighs the need to provide restitution to any
victims through the criminal process."81
Several considerations may influence this determination. These in-
clude (1) the difficulty of identifying affected victims, (2) the court's abil-
ity to measure compensable victim losses with reasonable certainty,
(3) the fraction of the victims' total harm that restitution will compensate
and the likelihood that victims will still resort to civil litigation even if
the court orders restitution, (4) the victims' resources and other factors
that will affect the ability of victims to seek civil recoveries if the court
withholds restitution, and (5) the problems that the court may encounter
in articulating and administering a restitution order or related probation
conditions.
The inclusion of victim loss assessments in most corporate sentencing
analyses may prompt courts to balance these factors differently for con-
victed corporations than for convicted individuals. Pursuant to the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure, a probation officer's presentencing
investigation report on a defendant awaiting sentencing must contain a
victim impact statement that describes the financial impact of the offense
on its victims.8 2 For a convicted organization, a sentencing court must
consider victim losses in setting every corporate fine unless the calcula-
tion of those losses would unduly complicate or prolong the sentencing
process. To the extent that courts regularly measure victim losses to sup-
80. Ia
81. US.S.G., supra note 1, § 8B1.1(b). When partial restitution can be ordered without sub-
stantial complication and prolongation of the sentencing process, courts are required to order partial
restitution. See 128 CONG. REC. H8469 (Oct. 1, 1982) (remarks of Rep. Peter Rodino); HUTCHIsoN
& YELLEN, supra note 41, at 341.
82. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(2)(D).
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port corporate fine determinations, the same information will be avail-
able for fashioning restitution orders. Courts may tolerate longer delays
and expend more effort to measure victim losses in determining corpo-
rate fines than they would if the only issue at stake was the proper
amount of restitution payments. To the extent that the need for victim
loss information in fine setting produces more of this information, it will
correspondingly reduce objections to restitution orders based on the diffi-
culty of victim loss measurements. This may produce more frequent res-
titution orders in corporate sentencing than in individual sentencing.
5. Constitutional Limitations on Restitution Sentences
A number of decisions under the Victim and Witness Protection Act
have tested the constitutional limits of restitution sentences. These same
constitutional boundaries will govern corporate restitution sentences
under the Sentencing Guidelines.
Constitutional due process constraints limit restitution sentencing pro-
cedures because factual determinations leading to restitution orders affect
significant property interests of defendants forced to pay restitution. 3
The Victim and Witness Protection Act delineates procedures for issuing
restitution orders84 that also apply to restitution sentencing under the
Guidelines. 5 These procedures require that, prior to sentencing, proba-
tion officers must collect information on victim losses resulting from an
offense, the financial resources of the offender, the financial needs and
earning ability of the offender and such other matters as the sentencing
court deems appropriate.8 6 A sentencing court must consider this infor-
mation in determining whether to order restitution and must make the
information available to both the defendant and the attorney for the gov-
ernment to allow each party to challenge the probation officer's find-
ings. 7 The sentencing court will resolve any dispute regarding the
amount or type of restitution based on the preponderance of the evi-
dence. 8  The government bears the burden of proving the amount of
83. See, eg., United States v. Sunrhodes, 831 F.2d 1537, 1541 (10th Cir. 1987). See generally
Diane M. Allen, Restitution Sentencing Under the Victim and Witness Protection Act, 79 A.L.R.
FED. 724, 732-37 (1986).
84. See 18 U.S.C. § 3664.
85. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8Bl.1(a) (indicating that restitution obligations must conform
to 18 U.S.C. § 3664, the procedural portion of the Victim and Witness Protection Act).
86. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3664(a), (b).
87. See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(c).
88. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d).
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losses sustained by offense victims, while the convicted corporation bears
the burden of proving both the limit of its financial resources and its
future financial needs.8 9 A sentencing court can impose restitution obli-
gations based on a documentary record alone without holding a separate
hearing on restitution issues.
In determining whether these restitution procedures satisfy due pro-
cess requirements, relevant considerations include the private and gov-
ernmental interests at stake, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
private interests through the procedures in place, and the probable value
of additional or substitute procedures.90 Given the availability of presen-
tencing reports to both parties and their opportunity to respond prior to
sentencing, federal appellate courts have concluded that the present pro-
cedures governing restitution orders are sufficiently accurate and protec-
tive of defendant interests to meet due process requirements. 91
Courts also have rejected other constitutional challenges to restitution
sentencing procedures. The formulation of a restitution order without a
hearing involving the presentation of witnesses does not infringe upon
constitutionally protected confrontation rights because a convicted party
has only a right to a restitution order based on accurate information, not
an absolute right to confront witnesses.92 The determination of restitu-
tion sentences is treated by courts as an aspect of criminal sentencing.
As such, a restitution determination does not trigger the Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial even though a separate assessment of
civil liability for the same victim losses would be subject to jury trial
requirements.93 Finally, the possibility of variations in restitution im-
posed on similarly situated offenders who differ only in the degree of
harm resulting from their crimes or their ability to pay restitution does
not constitute a denial of equal protection because the criminal justice
system has always allowed variations in criminal sentences based on indi-
vidual circumstances and offense consequences.94
89. Id.
90. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); Sunrhodes, 831 F.2d at 1540-41 (10th
Cir. 1987).
91. See Sunrhodes, 831 F.2d at 1542-43.
92. Id. at 1543-44.
93. See United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1117
(1985); United States v. Florence, 741 F.2d 1066 (8th Cir. 1984). See generally Allen, supra note 83,
at 740-42.
94. See United States v. Palma, 760 F.2d 475, 478 (3d Cir. 1985). See generally Allen, supra
note 83, at 737-40.
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B. Deferred Restitution
Instead of ordering immediate restitution payments, sentencing courts
can impose probation conditions obligating convicted corporations to
make restitution payments over time.95 These deferred restitution obli-
gations can extend over the maximum period allowed for probation
sentences-five years for a felony or misdemeanor and one year for an
infraction.96
Deferred restitution obligations reflect concern for the interests of both
victims and convicted corporations. The total amount of restitution that
can be paid over time may be substantially greater than a defendant's
immediate ability to pay. Deferred restitution payments draw upon a
convicted corporation's future earning potential as well as its assets at the
time of sentencing. 97 By providing victims greater compensation, de-
ferred restitution can increase the restorative effect of restitution
sentences and offset a greater degree of criminal disruption than immedi-
ate restitution payments alone.
However, deferred restitution also serves offender interests by relieving
financial pressures for larger immediate payments to crime victims.
Overly large restitution sentences may threaten the viability of a con-
victed firm and risk collateral harm to innocent third parties like employ-
ees, customers, suppliers, and shareholders. 98 While these collateral
interests do not outweigh victim interests to the extent that courts should
withhold restitution altogether, these interests do merit consideration in
placing proper limits on restitution amounts and in assessing the need for
flexible restitution payment schemes.
The Guidelines encourage this balancing of victim and third party in-
terests. The Guidelines limit mandatory restitution to types of payments
authorized by the Victim and Witness Protection Act, which in turn re-
quires courts to limit restitution orders to reflect a convicted corpora-
tion's ability to pay. A corporate defendant's ability to pay restitution
will be measured by comparing the firm's financial resources (both pres-
ent and future estimated revenues) with the needs of the firm.
In a parallel context, the Guidelines indicate that courts should reduce
corporate fines to a level that will not threaten a defendant firm's contin-
95. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, §§ 8D1.l(a)(1), (2).
96. 18 U.S.C. § 3561(b).
97. See ABEL & MARSH, supra note 20, at 131-33.
98. See id. at 180.
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ued viability.99 This principle should also apply to limit restitution or-
ders. Note that protection of a firm's continued viability requires more
than the mere avoidance of bankruptcy. Rather, with the satisfaction of
its restitution obligations, a firm should have the ability to compete suc-
cessfully for customers and remain fiscally sound.
Where the payment of both restitution and fines would threaten an
organization's financial soundness, the new Sentencing Guidelines state a
clear preference for restitution payments. The Guidelines require sen-
tencing courts to reduce fines to insure that a convicted firm can make
full restitution."°° Also, where the offender makes deferred payments,
the amounts involved are applied first to restitution obligations, next to
outstanding fines, and finally to any other monetary sanction
obligations.101
Various patterns of deferred restitution payments can be required
under probation terms. Payment can be compelled in specific install-
ments or by a certain date. Restitution arrangements tailored to corpo-
rate environments might require payment of restitution amounts before
any dividends are paid to shareholders or payments of restitution
amounts in a specified proportion to dividends.
Probation terms can include provisions to secure the payment of de-
ferred restitution obligations. A corporate offender can be compelled to
report on aspects of firm performance that will affect its ability to pay
deferred restitution.102 For example, a sentencing court might require
reporting on progress toward setting aside funds sufficient to meet later
payment obligations. Alternatively, a sentencing court might require a
convicted firm to report plans to transfer assets over a certain dollar
value, thereby allowing the court to determine whether the transfer will
materially affect the firm's ability to meet its restitution obligations. A
court can require a corporation to submit to periodic examinations of its
books and interrogation of knowledgeable individuals regarding the or-
ganization's ability to pay restitution amounts when due., °3 Probation
conditions also can mandate that a corporation pay the fees and costs of
experts retained by a sentencing court to review reports submitted by the
99. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8C3.3. A fine must be reduced when, even with an installment
schedule, payment of the full fine would "substantially jeopardize the continued existence of the
organization." Id. (Application (n.1)).
100. Id. § 8C3.3(a).
101. Id. § 8D1.4(b)(4).
102. Id. § SD1.4(b).
103. Id.
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corporation, to examine corporate records, or to interview corporate per-
sonnel for the purpose of assessing the likelihood of the corporation's
compliance with a restitution order."°
C. Remedial Orders
As an alternative to criminal restitution, a convicted organization can
be ordered to remedy the harm caused by an offense and to eliminate or
reduce the risk that the instant offense will cause future harm.105 Com-
pliance with a remedial order will be enforced as a condition of proba-
tion."°6 Authorized requirements include the creation of trust funds
sufficient to compensate victims in the future as they suffer or recognize
harm from an offense.1" Remedial orders such as these were intended
by the Sentencing Commission to be fallback sanctions for corporate of-
fenders, imposed only when restitution orders are insufficient to address
victim injuries. 0 8 Reasons why restitution might be inadequate-and re-
medial orders correspondingly justified-include difficulty in identifying
crime victims and the scope of their economic damage,10 9 the presence of
small damage to numerous victims making individual recoveries proce-
durally inefficient, or the involvement of aesthetic or other non-pecuniary
harm in an offense.
Where a federal regulatory agency has authority over activities poten-
tially covered by a remedial order, the sentencing court must coordinate
the order with agency actions.110 This may entail withholding a remedial
order if a regulatory agency has the authority to enforce similar remedial
requirements or tailoring a remedial order to provide for reporting to and
oversight by regulatory officials.
A wide range of remedial efforts are within court discretion to order
under these provisions. Two areas where these orders may be particu-
larly important are food and drug violations and environmental offenses.
For example, where a firm is convicted of illegally marketing drugs, the
104. See id.
105. Id. § 8B1.2(a).
106. See id.
107. Id. § 8B1.2(b).
108. Id. § B1.2(a).
109. Cf. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 910 (2d ed. 1990) (noting that remedies restor-
ing injured parties to their circumstances prior to injury can compensate them for the full measure of
their losses, not just those reflected in the diminution of the market value of affected property).
110. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8B1.2 (comment.).
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firm might be required to recall unsold product units 1 and contact users
of the drug to prevent further usage. The firm also might be compelled
to provide medical screening to past users of the drug to help them recog-
nize harm resulting from use of the drug. In an environmental context,
remedial orders might be used to require an offender to clean up after an
illegal oil spill,112 to conduct follow-up studies of related environmental
damage, and to take affirmative actions to aid in the restoration of plant
and wildlife populations.113
The potential breadth of remedial orders following criminal corporate
conduct represents both the strength and weakness of these sanctions.
Corrective measures like the examples described above can lessen the dis-
ruptive impact of corporate offenses. However, the Sentencing Guide-
lines state no limiting principles for determining how far a sentencing
court should extend remedial orders. Two types of considerations will
properly limit these orders. First, offender resource limitations should
play a role in determining the proper scope of offender obligations under
remedial orders. Second, the efficacy of further remedial activity should
be considered in crafting remedial orders.
Offender resource limitations are probably the easier of these two re-
strictions for courts to apply. The expense of complying with remedial
orders should probably be limited under the same principles governing
restitution orders and corporate fines. Thus, courts should not order re-
medial tasks that are sufficiently expensive to threaten a convicted firm's
viability. While courts should remain skeptical about possibly inflated
remedial cost estimates by convicted firms, where courts can estimate
remedial costs objectively-perhaps through independent expert testi-
mony-those costs should be compared to a convicted firm's future fi-
nancial needs to determine the proper scope of compelled remedial
efforts. Often, firm resources will place a clear limit on the range of re-
medial tasks that a convicted corporation can be expected to undertake,
preempting more difficult issues about the sufficiency of further remedial
efforts that might be required were cost not a limiting factor.
If firm assets and income do not significantly limit remedial alterna-
tives available to a sentencing court, questions about the sufficiency of
111. Id.
112. See id.; cf. United States v. Allied Chem. Corp., 420 F. Supp. 122 (E.D. Va. 1976) (firm
guilty of illegal pollution discharges required to clean up affected river).
113. See United States v. Seest, 631 F.2d 107 (8th Cir. 1980) (defendant required to restore
wetlands destroyed for irrigation).
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various remedial alternatives will be unavoidable. The standards under
which courts should measure the sufficiency of various remedial steps are
far from clear. The circumstances of the Exxon Valdez oil spill illustrate
the problems that may face courts considering remedial orders. There,
the resources of the Exxon Corporation were more than sufficient to
cover vast remedial efforts. Yet, at some point, the marginal environ-
mental gain from additional remedial steps was not worth the costs to
both Exxon and society of those steps. Had Exxon been less aggressive
in pursuing clean-up efforts on its own, a sentencing court fashioning a
remedial order to compel clean-up efforts would have been forced to se-
lect an approach or standard for measuring the sufficiency of Exxon's
remedial efforts. Full environmental restoration will typically be impos-
sible in a case like the Exxon Valdez spill. In lieu of complete restora-
tion, a sentencing court might require that remedial efforts continue until
further remedial steps would achieve no net environmental benefit-i.e.,
until further remedial steps would inflict as much new damage as the
damage they alleviate. As another alternative, a court might measure the
sufficiency of remedial efforts based on the availability of untried reme-
dial conduct likely to produce substantial environmental improvements.
A convicted corporation would be permitted to cease remedial efforts
once no more of these highly effective techniques were available. This
alternative avoids requiring offenders to undertake expensive remedial ef-
forts of modest environmental benefit. 114
Even when sufficient remedial action can be defined, it must also be
recorded in a policeable remedial order. Terms of a remedial order must
be sufficiently specific to allow both the corporate offender and those who
will enforce the order, such as probation officers, regulatory officials and
subsequent courts, to fairly determine its requirements."' It will be in-
adequate for a remedial order to provide that the sufficiency of remedial
efforts will be determined during the course of those efforts without also
114. Cf. Puerto Rico v. S.S. Zoe Coloctroni, 628 F.2d 652, 675 (1st Cir. 1980) (responsibility of
illegal polluter extends to the restoration or rehabilitation of the environment in the affected area to
its preexisting condition or as close thereto as is feasible without grossly disproportionate expendi-
tures; restoration efforts should include those actions that a reasonable and prudent party would take
to mitigate the harm done by the pollution, taking into account such factors as technical feasibility,
harmful side effects, compatibility with or duplication of such regeneration as is naturally to be
expected, and the extent to which expenditures beyond a certain point would be redundant or dis-
proportionate to the environmental improvement achieved).
115. Cf United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 465 F.2d 58, 61 (7th Cir. 1972) (probation
conditions invalidated because they were so vague that "the probationer may not know when they
are satisfied").
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including an objective standard for measuring the adequacy of the reme-
dial efforts or the results achieved. A remedial order lacking such an
objective standard will not only provide the offender with little, if any,
notice of what is required, but will risk arbitrary determinations of com-
pliance with the order.1 16
D. Community Service
Community service by convicted corporations is another form of reme-
dial sanction authorized by the Sentencing Guidelines.1 17 Sentencing
courts can require corporate offenders to engage in community service
that is "reasonably designed to repair the harm caused by the offense." 18
Community service should not be used as an indirect means to impose
financial burdens on a convicted firm since a community service order is
a less efficient means to achieve this end than a direct fine. 1 19 Rather,
courts should impose community service orders only when "the con-
victed organization possesses knowledge, facilities, or skills that uniquely
qualify it to repair damage caused by the offense."' 20
The Commission apparently considered acceptable community service
to include activities that repair damage from the corporation's offense, as
well as activities that help prevent similar offenses and harm in the fu-
ture. 2 ' The Guidelines endorse community service when a corporate
offender can efficiently repair offense damage through its own efforts.122
116. See, eg., S. REP. No. 225, supra note 9, at 100 (noting that a court must give a probationer
a written statement of probation conditions to insure fair and efficient enforcement of probation
terms).
117. For a thoughtful analysis of corporate community service as a means to promote deter-
rence, retribution, and redress in corporate sentencing, see Brent Fisse, Community Service as a
Sanction Against Corporations, 1981 Wis. L. REv. 970, 978-90, 1001-16.
118. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8B1.3.
119. However, community service may constitute a sensible sanction when a firm is unable to
pay its full fine. See, eg., United States v. Danilow Pastry Co., 563 F. Supp. 1159, 1166-67
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (community service obligations protect third parties from the adverse impact of
firm failures due to large fines, yet still impose a high degree of punishment).
120. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8B1.3 (comment.). Even when a defendant firm does not have
exceptional capabilities to repair offense harm, community service orders may be justified to achieve
partial offense remedies where restitution would be unwise because the dollar value of injuries sub-
ject to restitution is small or difficult to measure or the identity of victims is hard to establish. See S.
REP,. No. 225, supra note 9, at 98; Richard Gruner, To Let the Punishment Fit the Organization:
Sanctioning Corporate Offenders Through Corporate Probation, 16 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 39 (1988).
121. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8B1.3 (comment.) (supporting community service involving
preventive or corrective action directly related to an offense).
122. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8BI.3 (comment.) (community service order is appropriate
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However, the Guidelines do not address community service arrange-
ments benefitting other organizations or institutions that are well suited
to repair damage from the instant offense or like damage to the same
community. If a particularly well-qualified remedial institution exists,
presumably actions by a convicted firm aiding that institution's reduction
of harm from a particular offense would have equal social value to the
firm's own community service. Corporate service aiding specialized or-
ganizations or groups that are particularly effective in preventing or min-
imizing damage from the type of offense committed by the corporation
should be considered an authorized form of community service under the
Guidelines.
The Sentencing Guidelines do not identify the features that distinguish
corporate community service orders from remedial orders. The former
are described as requiring a convicted corporation to "repair the harm
caused by the offense," '123 while the latter entail efforts to "remedy the
harm caused by the offense."' 24 While a common remedial focus is cer-
tainly present, there is little difference in the description of these types of
orders other than the labels used.
However, these labels suggest that the Commission contemplated that
community service orders would resemble community service obligations
previously ordered by federal courts. In the past, corporate community
service was required for three purposes beyond remedying harm from a
particular offense: (1) increasing corporate punishment and deterrence by
requiring embarrassing corporate activities, (2) heightening punishment
and deterrence by requiring specific corporate officials to undertake bur-
densome service, and (3) offsetting community harm from offenses
through corporate charitable contributions and other public service unre-
lated to the harm caused by an offense.
Community service orders can impose valuable types of punishment
and deterrence in corporate sentencing. Such sentences have previously
been employed by federal courts. For example, where a corporate de-
fendant engaged in price fixing concerning some of its bakery products,
the firm was required to give similar bakery products to charitable orga-
nizations, in part to draw public attention to the offense.1 25 Similar re-
when convicted organization "possesses knowledge, facilities, or skills that uniquely qualify it to
repair damage caused by the offense").
123. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8B1.3.
124. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § BI.2(a).
125. United States v. Danilow Pastry Co., 563 F. Supp. 1159, 1166-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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quirements that force convicted firms to perform onerous or
embarrassing community service can play upon fears of corporate man-
agers to produce punishment and deterrence that could not be imposed
through fines alone.126 To the extent that the administrative and reputa-
tional burdens of onerous community service are not easily translated
into monetary terms, those burdens will fall on corporate personnel and
cannot be externalized. 127
The Sentencing Guidelines do not recommend community service for
punitive or deterrent purposes alone. 128 The Guidelines provide that
compelled community service should remedy offense harm, suggesting
that community service imposed for purely punitive or deterrent reasons
is inappropriate. Even with this restriction, courts can tailor community
service obligations to provide for some impact on corporate reputations
along with remedial benefits and thereby serve punitive or deterrent goals
as well as remedial ends.
Corporate community service has previously entailed service obliga-
tions imposed on specific executives who were not themselves convicted
of an offense." 9 The involvement of high-level managers in corporate
community service activities may be necessary for community service to
have the types of reputational impacts that will have significant punitive
and deterrent value. The reputation of a firm and the attitudes of its
managers will be less likely to change if a firm can designate a low-level
employee to perform its community service than if that service must be
performed by a high-ranking corporate officer.1 30  Yet these benefits
come at the expense of a probation obligation that smacks of punishing
unconvicted parties for the criminal conduct of corporations.13 1 In any
case, because they are aimed at purely punitive and deterrent goals, com-
126. See John C. Coffee, Jr., "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick" An Unscandalized Inquiry
into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 452-55 (1981).
127. See Fisse, supra note 117, at 1005-06.
128. However, since the provisions of the new guidelines on community service orders are only
advisory policy statements, a sentencing court could choose to go beyond this portion of the guide-
lines and impose a community service order based on punitive or deterrent principles.
129. See United States v. Yellow Freight Sys. Inc., 762 F.2d 737, 739 (9th Cir. 1985) (obligating
sentenced corporation to devote 100 hours of corporate officer's time to community service); United
States v. Mitsubishi Int'l Corp., 677 F.2d 785, 787 (9th Cir. 1982) (requiring corporation to loan one
executive to ex-offender program for one year).
130. See Fisse, supra note 117, at 983, 985; Gruner, supra note 120, at 40-41.
131. Cf. Fiore v. United States, 696 F.2d 205, 208 (2d Cir. 1982) (corporate executive cannot be
required to serve the sentence or pay the fine of his corporate co-defendant).
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munity service obligations aimed at specific individuals or officers are dis-
favored under the Guidelines for the reasons discussed above.
Another form of corporate community service ordered in the past, but
disfavored under the new Guidelines, is "community restitution"-that
is, community service through charitable contributions or other mone-
tary support of social programs benefitting a community as a whole,
rather than victims of an offense. Under prior law, several sentencing
courts imposed such requirements, including, for example, obligations to
endow a chair at a university132 or to make contributions to designated
charities.133 Critics of this practice argued that it imposed too little hard-
ship on firms in relationship to the seriousness of their crimes, diverted
funds from public use that might otherwise have been collected as fines,
involved standardless assessments of the adequacy of contribution levels
and arrangements, ignored the institutional limitations of sentencing
courts that make them poorly qualified to select among countless worthy
charities and organizations, subjected sentencing courts to criticism over
suspected favoritism in the selection of contribution recipients, and cre-
ated possible conflicts of interest where charities solicited contributions
from sentencing courts. 134 Probation terms requiring corporate charita-
ble contributions were struck down by every circuit court that considered
their validity. 135 While more recent sentencing statutes arguably support
this practice,1 36 the new Sentencing Guidelines wisely recommend
against probation terms mandating charitable contributions. 137
E. Notices to Crime Victims
A final remedial sanction authorized under the Sentencing Guidelines
is aimed not at directly remedying criminal conduct, but rather at facili-
tating individual recoveries. 138 For offenses involving fraud or "other in-
132. United States v. Missouri Valley Constr. Co., 741 F.2d 1542, 1545 (8th Cir. 1984) (en
banc).
133. E.g., United States v. Clovis Retail Liquor Dealers Trade Ass'n, 540 F.2d 1389, 1390 (10th
Cir. 1976). Cf United States v. John Scher Presents, Inc., 746 F.2d 959, 961 (3d Cir. 1984) (requir-
ing convicted firm to promote concerts to raise funds for local charities).
134. See Gruner, supra note 120, at 22-23.
135. See John Scher Presents, 746 F.2d at 964; Missouri Valley Constr., 741 F.2d at 1545-51;
United States v. Wright Contracting Co., 728 F.2d 648, 653 (4th Cir. 1984); United States v. Prescon
Corp., 695 F.2d 1236, 1238-40, 1242-44 (10th Cir. 1982); Clovis Retail Liquor Dealers, 540 F.2d at
1390-91.
136. See Gruner, supra note 120, at 37-38.
137. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8B1.3 (comment.).
138. For discussions of the goals of victim notices as a sentencing tool, see S. REP. No. 225,
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tentionally deceptive practices,"139 a sentencing court may order a
corporate defendant to give victims "reasonable notice and explanation
of the conviction, in such form as the court may approve."" The court
may not require a type of notice that will cost more than $20,000 per
offense.14 1 Furthermore, it must balance the costs entailed in providing
notices to victims against the losses caused by the offense.142
A sentencing court may order victim notices to be distributed by mail,
advertisements in specific areas or through specific media, or by other
means.143 Judicial review of the form and scope of victim notice methods
serves to insure that offenders make more than token efforts to provide
victims with notice of an offense. 1"
Victim notice orders will rarely be justified for regulatory offenses by
corporations because these types of crimes typically lack the deceptive
intent necessary to support a victim notice requirement.145 Furthermore,
these types of offenses seldom entail large victim losses of the sort that
would justify substantial victim notice costs. By contrast, in cases of
fraudulent or concealed misconduct like price fixing, corporate crime vic-
tims will often not appreciate their status as such. 146 Hence, victim no-
tices will serve a valuable purpose in such cases and should be ordered if
effective means of notifying victims can be devised.
supra note 9, at 83-84; Harvey M. Silets & Susan W. Brenner, The Demise of Rehabilitation: Sentenc-
ing Reform and the Sanctioning of Organizational Criminality, 13 AM. J. CRIM. L. 329, 375-78
(1986).
139. 18 U.S.C. § 3555 (1988). Fraudulent conduct in concealing an otherwise non-deceptive
offense may be sufficient to meet this test. See id.
140. Id. Obligations to provide victim notices can be imposed on both corporate and individual
offenders. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1, §§ 5F1.4, 8B1.4; cf FINAL REPORT, supra note 64, at 276
(proposing distribution of notices to victims as a special criminal sanction for organizational
offenders).
141. 18 U.S.C. § 3555. It is unclear whether the $20,000 cost limit on victim notices applies to
each offense or to some other unit of activity. The interpretation of this amount as a per offense limit
is consistent with the rest of the victim notice statute, which refers to notices ordered for particular,
qualifying offenses. See id. The limit might also apply on a per victim or per case basis. The former
interpretation seems unlikely because, in specifying advertising as a means of victim notice, Congress
anticipated multi-victim cases and yet indicated that the $20,000 limit would apply. The latter inter-
pretation appears too restrictive. A larger pattern of offenses will typically involve more numerous
and diverse victims than a single offense. Consequently, it is unlikely that Congress intended to limit
permissible victim notice costs without regard to whether a case involves one conviction or many.
142. 18 U.S.C. § 3555.
143. Id.
144. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 9, at 84.
145. Id.
146. John Braithwaite & Gilbert Geis, On Theory and Action for Corporate Crime Control, 28
CRIME & DELINQ. 292, 295 (1982).
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Actual notice to the greatest possible number of victims is the goal of a
victim notice sanction.14 This goal will often suggest the proper notice
mechanism for a given offense. For example, when a corporation com-
mits fraud against a few individuals, letters sent to those parties should
be an adequate notice method.I4 l By contrast, when a firm commits
fraud on a broad scale or over a substantial period of time and the iden-
tity of affected victims is not known, a series of advertisements in publi-
cations likely to reach the victims would constitute an appropriate notice
vehicle. 14
9
While the primary focus of victim notices is on furthering later civil
claims against the offender, these notices also will spread adverse public-
ity about the offender. Such publicity can have its own punitive impact
on a firm. In addition, the distribution of victim notices may alert regu-
latory or state enforcement agencies to corporate misconduct."' To the
extent that victim notices describing an offense are distributed to persons
considering future dealings with the offender, these notices also may pre-
vent further offenses by reducing the likelihood that those persons will
deal with the offender or by improving their abilities to monitor poten-
tially criminal conduct by the offender.'
III. PREVENTIVE SANCTIONS
The Sentencing Guidelines also authorize a number of preventive cor-
porate sanctions. The aim of these sanctions is to prevent further of-
fenses by a firm whose past illegal conduct or other organizational
features suggest that it is offense-prone.15 2 Even though an offense does
not conclusively indicate a proclivity towards further corporate crime,
147. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 9, at 84.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See Gruner, supra note 120, at 43-44.
151. See W. B. Fisse, The Social Policy of Corporate Criminal Responsibility, 6 ADEL. L. REV.
361, 408-09 (1978); Brent Fisse, The Use of Publicity as a Criminal Sanction Against Business Corpo-
rations, 8 MELB. U. L. REV. 107, 125 (1971).
152. Although rehabilitation of individual offenders within the federal penal system is viewed by
many as a failed approach to street crime, see Robert Martinson, What Works: Questions and An-
swers about Prison Reform, 35 PUB. INTEREsT 22 (1974), rehabilitation of corporate offenders
through probation sentences compelling improvements in offender practices is more likely to suc-
ceed. Although it may be difficult to reorient or rehabilitate a human psyche, "it is much easier to
rearrange a corporation's standard operating procedures, defective control systems, inadequate com-
munication mechanisms, and in general its internal structure." RUSSELL MOKHIBER, CORPORATE
CRIME AND VIOLENCE 33. (1988).
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the Guidelines adopt the view that an offense suggests the need for a
detailed examination of a convicted corporation's internal law compli-
ance standards and enforcement mechanisms, with compelled improve-
ments where necessary to avoid further misconduct. As a corollary, the
Guidelines support the notion that managers of corporate defendants
should have the first opportunity to evaluate law compliance programs
and make corrective adjustments following an offense. Sentencing courts
are authorized to step in only to determine the sufficiency of corporate
responses and to compel changes when firm managers do not adopt
needed reforms voluntarily.
Several types of sanctions can be used to further these ends. Restric-
tive probation sentences constraining firm conduct during a period of
court supervision are authorized in several forms. One variety directly
constrains post-offense conduct by corporate personnel in ways that
make further offenses less likely. A second type of probation sentence
insures that sources of firm misconduct are identified and revealed to
shareholders, employees, and other interested parties, thereby permitting
this information to be taken into account in corporate governance and
accountability processes. The aim of such disclosures is to assist private
processes that tend to constrain corporate conduct within legal bounds.
An additional type of preventive sentence under the new Guidelines in-
volves adverse publicity aimed at transmitting information about a firm's
offense to a broad range of parties such as potential consumers of a firm's
products or services. With greater information about an offense, these
parties can adjust their subsequent dealings with a convicted firm to bet-
ter detect and prevent corporate crimes. Furthermore, the threat of ad-
verse public reactions following offense publicity creates substantial
crime deterrents for corporate managers.
A. Corporate Probation as a Criminal Sentence
1. Statutory Standards
One of the most important developments in corporate sentencing law
during the past several years was the elevation of probation sanctions to
the level of full-fledged sentences. Corporate probation sentences involve
probation terms that exert a measure of continuing court control over
narrow aspects of corporate conduct.153 The Sentencing Reform Act of
1984 authorized corporate probation sentences to serve a variety of fed-
153. See generally Gruner, supra note 120.
[Vol. 71:261
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol71/iss2/3
1993] BEYOND FINES: INNOVATIVE CORPORATE SENTENCES
eral sentencing goals. 154 The Act granted sentencing courts considerable
flexibility in developing innovative probation conditions to achieve those
goals. 155
Once a matter of grace offered by courts as an alternative to harsher
fines, corporate probation was subject to rejection by managers of a cor-
porate defendant if they felt that proposed probation terms were more
onerous than the maximum fines facing their firm.156 By contrast, corpo-
rate probation is now a sentence in its own right that, like other sentences
such as fines, is not subject to rejection by convicted firms. Probation
sentences can be imposed for essentially all crimes that corporate agents
are likely to commit. 157 Under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, pro-
bation sentences can be imposed in addition to maximum fines.15 1
The Act imposes several limitations on corporate probation. Proba-
tion can last between one and five years for a felony offense and up to five
years for any other offense.159 Probation terms are to be specified by a
sentencing court following the preparation of a pre-sentencing report by
a probation officer or court-appointed expert. 6 ° This report must ad-
dress the nature of the convicted firm's offense and the types of sentences,
including probation terms, that should be imposed.1 61 A pre-sentencing
report must be disclosed to the defendant, the defendant's counsel and
the attorney for the government at least ten days prior to sentencing to
allow for submissions to the court challenging disputed findings or sen-
tence recommendations. 162 Once selected by a sentencing court, proba-
tion terms must be stated in clear terms that are sufficient to establish a
standard against which personnel of the probationer, probation officials
154. See 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (Supp. III 1985); S. REP. No. 225, supra note 9, at 50-51, 59, 68, 88
(sentences can be imposed in order to achieve any of the objectives outlined in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(2)).
155. See 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(21); S. RPs. No. 225, supra note 9, at 131. Broad discretion in
setting probation conditions is desirable if courts are to develop effective probation conditions for
highly diverse corporate defendants. See W.B. Fisse, Responsibility, Prevention, and Corporate
Crime, 5 N.Z.U. L. Rv. 250, 276 (1973).
156. The history of corporate probation sentencing under the Federal Probation Act is discussed
in detail in Gruner, supra note 120, at 11-26.
157. Corporate probation sentences are appropriate for all federal crimes except where a statute
expressly prohibits probation. 18 U.S.C. § 3561(a).
158. See 18 U.S.C. § 3551(c).
159. 18 U.S.C. § 3561(b).
160. See 18 U.S.C. § 3552(b).
161. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 9, at 72.
162. 18 U.S.C. § 3552(d).
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and reviewing courts can measure the probationer's compliance. 163
Certain substantive features of corporate probation are required under
the Act. First, all corporate probation sentences must include a require-
ment that the firm involved not commit another federal, state, or local
crime during the term of probation. 164 This provision retains the power
of the sentencing court to revoke or modify probation conditions or to
completely resentence the defendant firm in light of misconduct by cor-
porate personnel during a term of probation. 65 The net effect is to raise
the penalties at stake for a further offense during a probation term. Sec-
ond, if a sentence of probation is imposed for a felony, the terms of pro-
bation must include a requirement that the corporate offender pay a fine,
provide restitution, or complete community service.' 6 6 This requirement
is aimed at insuring that all felony offenders feel a substantial impact
from an offense serious enough to constitute a felony. Third, when a
sentence imposed on an organization does not include a fine, it must in-
lude some form of probation. 167 This requirement appears to reflect the
view that convicted firms receiving a light sentence involving no fine
should stay under court control, both as a means to facilitate harsher
resentencing should subsequent misconduct indicate that the light sen-
tence was a mistake and as a method of reminding firm managers that
their organization has committed an offense, even if this was not reflected
in a fine.
While the Sentencing Reform Act contains a list of probation condi-
tions that can be imposed at the discretion of sentencing courts, this list
is not exhaustive. Rather, sentencing courts can require compliance with
a broad range of probation conditions, subject to two limitations. First,
163. 18 U.S.C. § 3563(d). See also United States v. Whitney, 785 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1986)
(finding restitution requirement without maximum amount too vague); United States v. Patterson,
627 F.2d 760, 760 (5th Cir. 1980) (rejecting probation condition that would have precluded associa-
tion with any group that advocates violation "of any local, state, or federal law"), cert. denied 450
U.S. 925 (1981); United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 465 F.2d 58, 61 (7th Cir. 1972) (finding
condition requiring cleanup program within 45 days too vague).
164. 18 U.S.C. § 3563(a)(1).
165. Revocation or modification of probation terms and resentencing of a corporation to maxi-
mum fines are potential sanctions for probation violations. See 18 U.S.C. § 3565(a). Courts can
impose such sanctions only following a hearing that meets the requirements of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. See FED. R. CRiM. P. 32.1(a).
166. 18 U.S.C. § 3563(a)(2). The exception to this general rule is that if a sentencing court finds
that extraordinary circumstances exist which would make the these conditions plainly unreasonable
the court may impose such probation terms as it deems appropriate. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3563(a)(2),
(b)(21).
167. 18 U.S.C. § 3551(c); U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8D1.1(a)(7).
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probation conditions must bear a reasonable relationship to (1) the na-
ture and circumstances of the offense, (2) the history and characteristics
of the offender, and (3) federal sentencing goals, including rehabilitation,
general deterrence, specific deterrence, and punishment.1 68 Second, pro-
bation conditions should deprive the offender of liberty or property only
to the extent reasonably necessary to further these same federal sentenc-
ing goals. 169
A variety of sanctions can be imposed for probation violations. A cor-
porate probationer found to have violated a term of probation can either
be continued on probation under enhanced probation terms or have its
probation revoked and be resentenced to any sanction that was available
at its original sentencing. 171 Individuals having notice of a sentencing
court's order imposing probation terms who (1) willfully violate those
terms, (2) prevent, obstruct, impede, or interfere with compliance with
those terms by others, or (3) intentionally hinder or delay the communi-
cation of any probation violation to a court or probation officer, will be
subject to contempt sanctions and individual criminal liability.17 1
2. Some Lessons from Past Corporate Probation Sentences
While probation sentences have been strengthened, Congress appears
to have intended that corporate probation be employed in a manner simi-
lar to its use in past sentencing. 172 Before the Sentencing Reform Act of
168. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
169. 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b). The application of this limitation to corporate probation terms is
problematic. Arguably, the types of liberty restrictions intended to be limited by this statutory pro-
vision were physical constraints on individual defendants such as partial confinement to a residence
or other types of partial incarceration. If so, then the corporate probation conditions will not impose
physical liberty constraints subject to this limitation. See Gruner, supra note 120, at 56.
With respect to property constraints, the question is not whether probation terms can affect corpo-
rate property, but rather what type of property the Sentencing Reform Act protects against depriva-
tion. Specifically, the provisions of the statute restricting probation terms to reasonably necessary
deprivations of property seem most logically interpreted as admonitions against excessive restitution
or other requirements of direct transfers of money or assets. It is less clear, however, that Congress
intended to limit probation terms merely because improvements in corporate law compliance prac-
tices and related monitoring of employee activities would entail additional corporate costs. Id. at 56-
57. Even if amounts spent on such activities are property within the meaning of statutory limits on
probation terms, courts will probably consider steps necessary to prevent subsequent corporate of-
fenses as expenditures reasonably necessary to satisfy federal sentencing goals.
170. 18 U.S.C. § 3565(a).
171. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1509, 1512 (1988).
172. The legislative history of the probation provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act refers with
approval to cases imposing corporate probation under prior law. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 9,
at 68 n.145.
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1984 superseded it, the Federal Probation Act 173 provided the basis for
several forms of corporate probation. Probation terms were imposed
under the Probation Act to rehabilitate, deter, and punish corporate of-
fenders and managers. 174
United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co. 175 illustrates one application of
corporate probation under the Federal Probation Act and some of the
problems attendant to using corporate probation as a sentencing tool. In
that case, the Atlantic Richfield Company ("ARCO") was convicted of
an illegal pollution discharge at one of its plants, following a prior con-
viction for similar conduct at the same facility.1 7 6 The sentencing court
imposed probation terms which gave ARCO sixty days to develop and
implement a program to "handle oil spillage into the soil and/or
stream." 177 If the firm failed to comply, the sentencing court threatened
to appoint a special probation officer with powers similar to a corporate
trustee who would insure that ARCO adopted sufficient pollution control
practices. 178
Obviously, one objective of these probation terms was the immediate
reform of ARCO's pollution control measures. A secondary concern of
the sentencing court was that the maximum $2500 fine for ARCO's
crime was inadequate to reflect the seriousness of its repeat offense.1 79
Hence, the company's probation conditions also were aimed at increasing
the criminal penalties and deterrents for a repeat offender like ARCO.
ARCO's loosely stated probation terms were challenged by the firm on
appeal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held
that, while a corporation could be placed on probation, the particular
terms of ARCO's probation were impermissibly vague. 180 The court
found the terms invalid because "the probationer may not know when
they are satisfied."181 It concluded that the vague probation terms failed
to provide fair notice of probation requirements to ARCO personnel and
173. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3651-3656 (1970), repealed by Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1985).
174. For a discussion of the purposes of corporate probation sentencing under the Federal Pro-
bation Act, see Grunter, supra note 120, at 16-18.
175. 465 F.2d 58 (7th Cir. 1972).
176. See CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS 184 (1975).
177. 465 F.2d at 61, n.1.
178. See id
179. See STONE, supra note 176, at 184-85. ARCO was potentially liable for fines totaling be-
tween $500 and $2500. A convicted individual would have faced the same fines plus imprisonment
of not less than 30 days and not more than one year. 33 U.S.C. § 411 (1964).
180. See 465 F.2d at 60-61.
181. Id. at 61.
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invited arbitrary or inequitable enforcement by probation officials.182
However, the court did not specify whether it considered these factors to
be statutory limitations on probation terms under the Federal Probation
Act or more basic constitutional due process limitations on probation
conditions. Alternatively, the court's real concern may have been either
that ARCO's probation terms effectively imposed a financial hardship on
ARCO in excess of the maximum statutory fine for its offense,'8 3 or that
the sixty day period allotted for the firm to develop and implement its
pollution control program was unreasonably short.18 4
The sentencing dilemma and outcome in Atlantic Richfield illustrate
several things about corporate probation. First, corporate probation of-
fers a means for sentencing courts to promote reform of organizational
offenders and the prevention of subsequent offenses. Second, terms of
probation can be tailored to the circumstances of a firm's offense and
operations, providing standards for performance guidance and monitor-
ing that are far more specific than general legal standards. Third, for
probation terms to serve these goals, they must be reasonably specific in
describing the conduct required of a probationer. Fourth, given the pen-
alties that may attach to probation violations, corporate probationers
have a right to concise statements of probation requirements against
which they and probation enforcement personnel can measure their per-
formance. All of these lessons remain relevant to corporate probation
sentencing under the new Sentencing Guidelines.
B. Types of Corporate Probation Sentences
The Sentencing Guidelines clarify the role of probation sanctions in
corporate sentencing. Three types of corporate probation sentences are
recommended under the Guidelines: (1) probation terms designed to pre-
vent future offenses by requiring specific changes or limitations on busi-
182. See STONE, supra note 176, at 188.
183. See id.; cf Rignal W. Baldwin, Recent Development, 3 U. BALT. L. REV. 294, 299-300
(1974).
A number of other courts recognized maximum fines as limits on the financial impact of probation
conditions imposed under the Federal Probation Act. See, eg., United States v. Interstate Cigar
Co., 801 F.2d 555, 556-57 (1st Cir. 1986); United States v. Mitsubishi Int'l Corp., 677 F.2d 785, 788
(9th Cir. 1982). Because courts can impose probation sentences in addition to maximum fines under
current sentencing law, this absolute cost constraint on probation terms no longer applies. See 18
U.S.C. § 3551(c); S. REP. No. 225, supra note 9, at 88. However, the cost of probation compliance
will affect the reasonableness of probation terms. See Gruner, supra note 120, at 60-63.
184. See Marjorie H. Levin, Note, Corporate Probation Conditions. Judicial Creativity or Abuse
of Discretion?, 52 FORDHAM L. REvIEW 637, 660 (1984).
1993]
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ness practices; (2) mandated analyses and disclosures about sources of
past offenses to improve outside monitoring of corporate behavior; and
(3) probation terms necessary to further otherwise unsatisfied goals of
federal sentencing.""
L Probation Sentences Requiring Offender Reforms
a. Advantages and Risks
Probation sentences requiring specific reforms by corporate offenders
serve several sentencing goals that are poorly addressed by other sanc-
tions. One important function of such probation sentences is to require
changes in conduct at the corporate rather than the individual level. Sys-
temic reforms of corporate practices will be particularly appropriate
where individual responsibility for an offense is difficult or impossible to
assign. Required improvements in management practices also may be
needed where corporate managers bear some responsibility for an offense
due to their adoption of a policy or practice that promoted its commis-
sion, their failure to detect and prevent the offense, or their failure to
respond to prior similar offenses by investigating those offenses and de-
veloping new corporate practices to avoid repetitions.
Compelled reforms of corporate operating practices also may be neces-
sary to serve the preventive goals of federal sentencing. Traditionally,
the threat of corporate fines has been expected to cause corporate manag-
ers to avoid illegal conduct and to discourage such conduct by subordi-
nates. However, corporate fines suffer from a number of deficiencies as
means to deter and prevent corporate crimes. Even if fines impose suffi-
cient costs at the corporate level to deter corporate managers from en-
couraging or tolerating corporate offenses, individuals within a corporate
organization might still perceive discipline by corporate managers or per-
sonal criminal liability as distant and contingent threats that do not out-
weigh immediate corporate rewards for performance achieved through
illegal conduct.
In addition to insuring conduct reforms that corporate fines may be
insufficient to achieve,' 8 6 mandated reforms may have other advantages.
185. Courts can also impose corporate probation to secure payment of deferred financial obliga-
tions such as restitution and fines. For a discussion of this use of corporate probation terms in the
context of deferred restitution, see supra text accompanying notes 90-100.
186. Compelled reforms provide a non-market alternative to fines as means to control corporate
crime. The primary focus of corporate fines is on pricing criminal activity at a level that will either
cause corporate managers and employees to forgo such conduct or create large charges for com-
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Reforms increasing outside monitoring of corporate employee behaviors
related to law compliance may be necessary to balance strong internal
pressures to attain profit-oriented performance goals. Continuous moni-
toring of such conduct can help insure that reforms adopted after an
offense are maintained throughout a significant term of probation, rather
than being ignored once the heightened attention associated with a crimi-
nal prosecution is no longer focused on a firm. Probation arrangements
involving monitoring of legally risky corporate conduct may raise the
perceived likelihood of crime detection in the minds of corporate employ-
ees and produce a rise in expected fines and deterrents concerning subse-
quent offenses. Finally, probation restraints may be an efficient means to
allocate limited government enforcement resources since they focus law
enforcement expenditures on a few firms self-identified as risk preferring
through their offenses.
Mandated probation reforms raise certain risks. Even with the aid of
outside experts, sentencing courts may fail to define corporate conduct
standards that compel firms to adopt behaviors likely to promote law
compliance. Probation monitoring may be insufficient to detect devia-
tions from required conduct. While reforms mandated under probation
terms may achieve some improvement in corporate law compliance, the
court and law enforcement resources expended to achieve this result
might be better utilized elsewhere. Corporate probation conditions may
restrict both legitimate and illegitimate business activities, producing
spillover damage in weakened corporate competitiveness, business fail-
pleted crimes so as to disadvantage firms committing offenses relative to competitors who act legally.
By contrast, internal reforms imposed through probation requirements represent a measure of fo-
cused government control over narrow aspects of corporate conduct. Even if one assumes a prefer-
ence for market mechanisms over government controls where these are both effective, there may be a
variety of reasons in a given case to believe that deterrent fines and market mechanisms may be
insufficient to prevent future crimes. First, likely detection rates may be small, making expected
costs of criminal activity too small to trigger market discipline either inside or outside a firm. Sec-
ond, even if an average firm might be deterred by the threat of market discipline associated with a
given level of fines, the manager of a particular firm may be risk-preferring, meaning that market
pressures will not have their desired crime prevention effect and therefore, direct restraints should be
used as a substitute. Third, the source of some corporate crimes may be low-level employees whose
conduct may not be directly affected by market pressures imposed on their firms and who will need
direct compulsion and monitoring to change their behavior to prevent future crimes. Fourth, where
market forces alone are insufficient to deter corporate crimes, monitoring and disclosure require-
ments imposed through probation terms may enhance market mechanisms both by insuring that
fines are more accurately focused to reach a higher percentage of all organizational offenders and by
raising the apparent price of each offense through elevating detection rates and expected fines.
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ures, and associated disruption to shareholders, employees, customers,
suppliers, and surrounding communities.
While these risks are real, they should be taken as dangers to avoid in
formulating and administering corporate probation terms rather than as
reasons to forego corporate probation altogether. Given its many poten-
tial advantages as discussed above, corporate probation is too valuable to
be ignored as a sentencing alternative. To reduce risks of harmful con-
straints on legitimate corporate activities, sentencing courts need to im-
pose corporate probation terms in ways that maximize opportunities for
corporate personnel to participate in shaping and enforcing mandated
reforms. In addition, sentencing courts need to minimize the impact of
their own limited managerial expertise by relying on appointed experts,
compensated by the probationer, to evaluate probation restrictions and
monitor probation compliance.
b. When Reforms Should be Required
A corporate probation sentence is required under the Guidelines in
several circumstances where the nature of an offense or the history of the
offender indicates an unusual likelihood of further offenses. Circum-
stances triggering mandatory probation include:
(1) The failure of an organization having fifty or more employees to
adopt prior to sentencing an effective program to prevent and de-
tect violations of law;"87
(2) Similar misconduct by corporate employees or agents within the
five years prior to sentencing that resulted in an adjudication of
corporate criminal liability; '8
(3) Similar misconduct by high-level personnel in the organization, or
the unit of the organization within which the instant offense was
committed, during the five years prior to sentencing that resulted
in an adjudication of individual criminal liability;' 9 and
(4) Circumstances indicating that probation requirements are neces-
sary to assure changes within the organization to reduce the likeli-
187. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8D1.1(a)(3); see also id. § 8AI.2 (comment. (n.3(k))) (describing
the minimum features of effective law compliance programs); Dan K. Webb & Steven F. Molo, Some
Practical Considerations in Developing Effective Compliance Programs: A Framework for Meeting the
Requirements of the Sentencing Guidelines, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 375 (1993).
188. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8D1.l(a)(4).
189. Id. § 8D1.1(a)(5).
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hood of future criminal conduct. 190
If a sentencing court finds one or more of these features present, the
court can require the offender to adopt and maintain a program to detect
and prevent future violations of law.191 An acceptable program should
be reasonably calculated to prevent criminal conduct in the organiza-
tion.192 Before requiring reforms in business practices, a sentencing
court should first allow managers of the convicted firm to propose new
law compliance practices and a schedule of implementation. This will
help insure that the practices under consideration promote law compli-
ance in ways that are consistent with the firm's broader business activi-
ties. If firm managers refuse to propose compliance reforms, a
sentencing court should appoint an outside expert to study the circum-
stances surrounding the corporation's offense and formulate suggested
reforms. Based on either an offender's proposal or that of an outside
expert, a sentencing court can require an organizational offender to make
specific improvements in its law compliance programs and related busi-
ness practices.
A sentencing court also can require a convicted firm to comply with
reasonable investigative measures designed to determine the corpora-
tion's compliance with probation terms and its continuation of mandated
reforms. The Sentencing Guidelines recommend two types of probation
terms to implement corporate probation monitoring. The first involves
periodic reports prepared by the probationer's personnel, at intervals and
in forms specified by the court, describing the probationer's progress
under its law compliance program. 193 Reports also can be required on
criminal prosecutions, civil litigation, or administrative proceedings com-
menced against the organization and investigations or formal inquiries by
government authorities.' 94
A second method of probation monitoring addressed in the Sentencing
Guidelines involves the investigation of a probationer's status by a proba-
tion officer. Such an investigation can include records inspections and
the interrogation of knowledgeable individuals by a probation officer or
190. Id. § 8D1.1(a)(6). While the Guidelines do not indicate the types of circumstances covered
by this provision, the absence of corporate self-studies concerning the causes of a corporate offense or
a lack of follow-through on the results of such studies would be logical grounds for determining that
changes will not occur absent court compulsion.
191. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8D1.4(c).
192. Id. § 8D1.4 (comment.).
193. Id. § 8DI.4(c)(3).
194. Id.
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an expert appointed by the court to undertake these tasks. A corporate
probationer can be required to submit to a reasonable number of regular
or unannounced examinations of its books or records to ascertain proba-
tion compliance.195 Knowledgeable individuals within the probationer's
organization can be required to provide information to probation officers
or court-appointed experts, but the Guidelines do not specify whether the
interrogation of such individuals can be compelled on an unannounced
basis or whether a party under interrogation has a right to have an addi-
tional corporate representative present. 196
c. Types of Required Reforms
The Guidelines do not specify the types of corporate conduct require-
ments that sentencing courts should impose under probation terms other
than to suggest that these restrictions should be aimed at preventing fu-
ture criminal conduct. Two types of conduct restrictions can further this
goal. The first entails the adoption of a general law compliance program
where one is absent at the time of sentencing. The second involves the
requirement or preclusion of specific business activities or reporting prac-
tices that will help promote greater law compliance in the area of the
firm's offense.
1) Compliance Programs
The minimum features of effective compliance programs are described
in the new Guidelines.197 These standards should aid sentencing courts
in determining the sufficiency of compliance programs in place at the
time of sentencing. 198 These same compliance program standards pro-
vide a blueprint for proposals by managers of corporate offenders and
outside experts concerning new compliance measures to be required
under probation terms. In defining standards for compliance programs,
the Sentencing Commission considered an effective program to be one
that responds to, and takes reasonable steps to prevent, those offenses
that are foreseeable in a given firm. The range of offenses that should be
195. Id. § 8D1.4(c)(4).
196. Id.
197. Id. § 8AI.2 (comment. (n.3(k))).
198. When those programs are inadequate and a convicted organization has 50 or more employ-
ees, a court must sentence the firm to probation. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8Dl.l(a)(3). While it is
not required in all cases, a firm placed on probation for this reason will usually be required to adopt
an adequate compliance program or make improvements in its existing program to make it effective.
See U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8D1.4(c).
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the target of preventive efforts depends on factors such as the likelihood
that certain offenses will occur because of the nature of the business and
the prior history of offenses or misconduct within the organization.199
The nature of a reasonable response to the offense threats facing a firm
will depend on factors like the size of the firm,2" the dictates of industry
practice, and the requirements of applicable governmental regulations
concerning compliance programs.2"1
Beyond these general rules, the Guidelines offer two types of standards
for assessing compliance programs. The first group of standards relate to
the offense currently under sentencing. The characteristics of the instant
offense may indicate that the offender's law compliance programs were
ineffective. For example, if the instant offense involved an individual
within high-level personnel of the organization, an individual within
high-level personnel of a unit of the organization having 200 or more
employees, or an individual responsible for the administration or enforce-
ment of the company's law compliance program, the program is conclu-
sively presumed to have been ineffective.20 2 Participation in the offense
by an individual with substantial managerial authority creates a rebutta-
ble presumption that the organization did not have an effective compli-
ance program.20 3 A law compliance program also is conclusively
presumed inadequate if, after becoming aware of the offense, organiza-
tion personnel unreasonably delayed reporting it to appropriate govern-
mental authorities.'
A second set of standards in the Sentencing Guidelines describe neces-
sary features of adequate law compliance programs.20 5 These features,
which a sentencing court should require in any compliance program
mandated under probation terms, include:
199. Id. § 8AL.2 (comment. (n.3(k)(ii)(iii))).
200. Larger organizations should generally have more formal compliance programs than smaller
firms, including written conduct standards and procedures for regulated or legally constrained oper-
ations. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8A1.2 (comment. (n.3(k)(i))).
201. While not determinative by itself, an organization's failure to incorporate and follow appli-
cable industry practice or to meet the requirements of any applicable governmental regulations
weighs against a finding that the company maintained an effective program to prevent and detect
violations of law. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8A1.2 (comment. (n.3(k)(7))).
202. Id. § 8C2.5(f).
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. See id. § 8A1.2 (comment. (n.3(k))).
19931
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a) Compliance Standards
The organization must establish law compliance standards and proce-
dures that are reasonably capable of reducing the prospect of criminal
conduct in organizational activities.
b) High-Level Responsibility
Specific individuals within high-level personnel of the organization
must be assigned overall responsibility to oversee compliance with such
standards and procedures.
c) Responsible Authority Delegation
The organization must use due care not to delegate substantial discre-
tionary authority to individuals whom the organization knew, or should
have known through the exercise of due diligence, had a propensity to
engage in illegal activities.
d) Communicating Standards
The organization must take effective steps to communicate and explain
its compliance standards and procedures to all its employees and other
agents. Standards can be communicated to affected parties by requiring
participation in compliance training programs, by distributing publica-
tions that explain law compliance requirements, or by similar notification
measures.
e) Monitoring and Auditing
The organization must take reasonable steps to measure compliance
with its standards---e.g., by adopting monitoring and auditing systems
designed to detect criminal conduct by its employees and agents and by
instituting and publicizing a reporting system whereby employees or
agents can inform corporate managers of criminal conduct by others
without fear of retribution.
f) Disciplinary Enforcement
The organization must consistently enforce its law compliance stan-
dards through appropriate disciplinary mechanisms, including discipline
of individuals responsible for management's failure to detect an offense in
a timely fashion.
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g) Offense Responses
After a firm detects an offense, it must take all reasonable steps to
respond to the offense and to prevent further similar crimes, including
modifying its law compliance programs to better detect and avoid similar
misconduct.
2) Business Practice Reforms
In addition to requiring a corporate offender to operate an effective law
compliance program, a sentencing court can restrict specific business
practices of the offender to help insure that repeat offenses do not occur.
Although a sentencing court cannot completely exclude a convicted firm
from a line of business,' it can require a corporate offender to conduct
specific business activities in a restricted fashion. A corporate proba-
tioner can be required to engage in particular business activities only to a
stated degree or under specified circumstances.2 0 7 Business practice re-
strictions should be aimed at compelling changes that will prevent the
continuation or repetition of particular abusive practices. For example,
"an organization convicted of executing a fraudulent scheme might be
directed to operate that part of the business in a manner that was not
fraudulent."20 8
The types of probation restraints that are appropriate in a given case
obviously will depend on the nature of the offense under sentencing and
the circumstances that prompted it. However, conduct restraints drawn
from three sources will provide convicted corporations, court-appointed
experts, and sentencing courts with some valuable suggestions regarding
potential probation terms.
206. Congress rejected proposed language in the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 that would
have authorized sentencing courts to bar a convicted organization from engaging in a particular
occupation, business, or profession. It removed this provision from the final bill, in part because of
complaints by business leaders that sentencing courts might use this authority to put legitimate
enterprises out of business following a regulatory offense. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 9, at 69,
96-97.
Even though they cannot be excluded from a particular line of business under probation terms,
organizations operated primarily for illegal purposes or primarily by criminal means can be driven
from all further business operations. Such organizations-dubbed "criminal purpose organizations"
in the Sentencing Guidelines--are subjected to draconian penalties aimed at putting the organiza-
tions out of business. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT
ON SENTENCING GUIDELINES FOR ORGANIZATIONS 5 (1991). The fines for these organizations are
set at amounts sufficient to divest them of all their net assets. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8C1..
207. See 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(6).
208. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 9, at 96.
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The first and most useful source will be the practices of similar firms.
Business practices already used by other firms to combat the type of ille-
gal conduct observed in the offending firm ought to be considered as can-
didates for probation requirements. Of course, the similarity of the
settings in which these practices are used to the offender's circumstances,
along with the degree of success they have achieved in assuring law com-
pliance, ought to be considered by a sentencing court before imposing
practices as probation requirements. Because they reflect the inventive-
ness and business experience of others (as well as, perhaps, a greater will-
ingness to try law compliance measures than is present in the defendant
organization), law compliance techniques of other firms described in
trade or legal journals or ascertainable from other sources ought to be
candidates for probation requirements.
A second source of possible probation restrictions lies in the experi-
ence of the convicted firm itself. The offense under sentencing is one
instructive bit of corporate experience, since it may reveal defects in cor-
porate policies or practices that need repair to help avoid repeat offenses
or to make later offenses more easily detected. Therefore, a full under-
standing of the offense under sentencing, its sources, the internal proce-
dures that might have prevented it, and the detection methods that might
have revealed it earlier should be considered by a sentencing court in
identifying desirable probation constraints. However, studies should not
be limited to the offense under sentencing. Rather, corporate managers
or outside experts should be required to assess whether other corporate
indicators like civil claims, complaints, or aborted transactions suggest
patterns of legally risky behavior like that reflected in the firm's offense.
These additional forms of past corporate behavior can be further indica-
tors of law compliance disfunction, suggesting the need for alternative
practices to prevent the repetition of revealed abuses. If firm managers
have not responded to these indicators as of sentencing, courts should
compel them to do so by appointing outside experts to propose appropri-
ate new constraints and by requiring compliance with those constraints
as corporate probation conditions.
General corporate management principles are a third source of infor-
mation on desirable corporate probation constraints. 0 9 By treating ille-
gal behavior of the sort present in the firm's offense as a type of corporate
209. For a more detailed discussion of the role general management principles can play in the
development of corporate probation terms, see Gruner, supra note 120, at 85-105.
[Vol. 71:261
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol71/iss2/3
1993] BEYOND FINES: INNOVATIVE CORPORATE SENTENCES
activity that should be discouraged or prevented by management
processes, established management principles can identify corporate pro-
bation terms that will help prevent further instances of such behavior.21
In general, these principles suggest means to reduce the likelihood that
individual corporate employees will undertake illegal conduct by restrict-
ing their discretion to select such conduct or by shaping their situational
incentives to discourage such choices.211 Changes to further these ends
can be made in corporate organizational, motivational, informational,
personnel selection, performance monitoring, and control practices.212 If
court-appointed experts, managers of the corporate probationer, or gov-
ernment attorneys can articulate why, in terms of established manage-
ment principles, specific corporate changes will be reasonably calculated
to prevent and detect further offenses,21 3 sentencing courts should rely on
those principles and impose the indicated reforms.
d. A Strategy for Reform Requirements
Corporate probation and other sanctions authorized under the Sen-
tencing Guidelines can create a range of incentives encouraging manag-
ers to respond to corporate crimes. To maximize the beneficial effect of
probation sentences, sentencing courts need to match the form of proba-
tion sentences to the cooperativeness of managers of convicted firms in
undertaking post-offense reforms.
The overall probation sentencing strategy which sentencing courts
should use in formulating probation requirements is a "tit-for-tat" en-
forcement pattern.214 Under this strategy, the extent and detail of court
control over a corporate probationer should vary in an inverse relation-
ship to the extent of voluntary efforts by corporate managers to formu-
late and institute post-offense reforms. That is, a sentencing court should
210. Management actions that further a particular corporate goal like law compliance can only
be specified in terms of relative merit. No single, best selection exists, but techniques that tend to
promote the desired end better than others can be identified. See, e.g., JAY GALBRAITH, ORGANI-
ZATION DESIGN 55 (1977); JAY W. LORSCH & PAUL R. LAWRENCE, STUDIES IN ORGANIZATION
DESIGN 1 (1970).
211. Cf OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, CORPORATE CONTROL AND BUSINESS BEHAVIOR 174-75
(1970) (interpreting corporate organizational structures in terms of their impact in modifying situa-
tional incentives and discretionary opportunities of corporate employees).
212. See Gruner, supra note 120, at 85-105.
213. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8D1.4 (comment.).
214. See JOHN BRAITHWAITE, To PUNISH OR PERSUADE: ENFORCEMENT OF COAL MINE
SAFETY 119-148 (1985); IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRAN-
SCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 35-53 (1992).
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cooperate with firm managers to the extent that managers pursue inter-
nal reforms voluntarily following an offense. However, when managers
resist reform efforts, sentencing courts should impose detailed, demand-
ing, and heavily monitored probation terms. By shifting enforcement
strategies in parallel with corporate cooperativeness, a sentencing court
can insure that firm managers with varying attitudes about the desirabil-
ity of voluntary corporate changes have meaningful incentives to pursue
and maintain commitments to post-offense reforms.
A range of specific probation enforcement strategies can be pursued
within the "tit-for-tat" framework. At one extreme lies voluntary adop-
tion of compliance plans and other reform measures by the corporate
offender prior to sentencing. The Sentencing Guidelines encourage this
process strongly, if indirectly. The Guidelines make the threat of court-
ordered probation and reforms manifest to corporate managers once a
corporate conviction appears likely. However, the Guidelines give cor-
porate managers an opportunity to act to improve their firm's position by
providing that post-offense responses should be considered in setting fines
and probation terms and by specifying that key determinations like the
sufficiency of corporate law compliance systems are to be made as of the
point of sentencing rather than the time an offense was committed. If
managers adopt substantial compliance programs voluntarily following
an offense, their efforts can avoid corporate probation entirely.
1) Voluntary Compliance
In probation sentencing, a court can cooperate with corporate manag-
ers by granting relatively unrestrictive probation terms. For their part,
managers of a corporate offender can cooperate in achieving federal sen-
tencing goals by formulating and implementing substantial corporate re-
forms prior to sentencing. This will require substantial self-studies to
identify sources of corporate offenses, further analyses of reform alterna-
tives and their probable effectiveness, and implementation of the reforms
identified as probably most effective. If managers undertake such a re-
sponse to corporate crime prior to sentencing, their firm deserves light
probation restrictions or no probation at all.2"5
215. If such reform efforts are underway, but uncompleted at sentencing, a sentencing court can
impose demanding probation terms while indicating to the managers of the sentenced corporation
that they should continue to develop their own probation proposals for submission to the court in a
motion seeking altered probation terms or a dismissal of probation altogether in light of the organi-
zation's reforms.
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In comparison with external enforcement through probation terms or
other mechanisms, internal development and implementation of post-of-
fense reforms through voluntary management efforts will be preferable
for several reasons. First, firm managers will typically have much easier
access to the information needed to carry out desirable reforms following
a corporate offense. 16 Second, firms will often have superior financial
resources to support the studies necessary to formulate reform measures
and to conduct further, ongoing monitoring of compliance with those
measures. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, firms will have a
greater capacity to sanction employees deviating from revised law com-
pliance standards and practices. The sanctions available to firms, includ-
ing salary, demotion, termination, and penalties, will often achieve
greater deterrence than public enforcement of similar reforms.
Yet, even when their organizations have voluntarily adopted substan-
tial law compliance reforms, firm managers must still feel that they have
something to lose from poor law compliance.217 One way to enhance this
motivation is for sentencing courts to impose criminal offense reporting
requirements on convicted firms. Any pattern of similar offenses re-
ported by a corporate probationer should trigger a thorough judicial re-
view of the adequacy of the firm's ongoing compliance efforts.
2) Enforced Self-Regulation
If firm managers hesitate to respond to a corporate offense, some suspi-
cion about the depth of management's commitment to law compliance is
justified, and a sentencing court should adopt a less cooperative proba-
tion approach. Where managers of a corporate offender have not volun-
tarily examined the need for post-offense reforms, a sentencing court
should consider a probation strategy involving enforced self-regulation of
law compliance standards.218 Under this arrangement, managers of a
216. The informational advantages held by firm managers over sentencing courts and appointed
experts acting under court appointments include greater accumulated background knowledge about
firm activities, broader knowledge of corporate information sources, better ability to interpret inves-
tigative results, and stronger sanctions available to compel disclosure or collection of additional
relevant information from corporate employees.
217. The likelihood that illegal conduct will be detected by public authorities will significantly
affect managers' assessments of crime risks. In some settings, such as small firms with frequent
public contracts or firms in heavily regulated and inspected industries, illegal conduct may be likely
to be detected and deterred accordingly. More substantial detection problems are likely to arise in
large corporate organizations operating in unregulated fields and in substantial resolution from pub-
lic scrutiny.
218. The notion of enforced self-regulation was first proposed as a strategy for regulatory re-
Washington University Open Scholarship
316 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
corporate offender would be given the opportunity to propose standards
for restricting corporate conduct to avoid further crimes like the offense
under sentencing. These standards would be reviewed for adequacy by
prosecutors, court-appointed experts and the sentencing court and then
modified to the extent necessary to insure a reasonable probability of sub-
sequent law compliance. Compliance with the resulting standards would
then. be made a condition of the corporation's probation.
Further probation terms would require the probationer to adopt inter-
nal corporate mechanisms for enforcing compliance with probation re-
strictions. These enforcement arrangements might include the creation
of a probation compliance staff within the corporate offender, the specifi-
cation of its duties and arrangements to isolate it from line-management
control, and the requirement of external reporting on compliance moni-
toring activities undertaken by the internal staff and their results.
These internal enforcement efforts could be coupled with probation
terms aiding external probation monitoring by probation officers or regu-
latory officials.219 This external monitoring would be aimed at detecting
gross abuses of the probationer's internal compliance systems. Appropri-
ate external monitoring activities would include: (1) assessments of
whether company standards are sufficient to insure compliance with ap-
plicable laws, (2) analyses to determine if company compliance officials
are free to identify compliance problems without pressure from perform-
ance-oriented corporate managers to downplay those problems, (3) anal-
yses of types of monitoring undertaken by internal compliance monitors,
(4) spot inspections to check that compliance personnel are detecting and
remedying violations of probation terms and other legal requirements,
and (5) investigations and reports to the sentencing court when a firm
fails to comply with probation terms.
By adopting this probation strategy, sentencing courts will oversee sys-
tems of privately developed and publicly ratified standards for insuring
compliance with underlying criminal law requirements. Probation con-
ditions developed in this manner will restate criminal law demands in
terms particulaiized and strengthened for convicted firms. These proba-
tion standards will serve as both targets for corporate action and meas-
ures of corporate law compliance success. Particularized probation
form. See AYREs & BRAITHWArTE, supra note 214, at 101-32. John Braithwaite, Enforced Self-
Regulation: A New Strategy for Corporate Crime Control, 80 MIcH. L. REV. 1466, 1467 (1982).
219. See BRAITHWAITE, supra note 214, at 126.
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terms will make later assessments of many probation violations simpler
than related analyses of criminal violations.
Under a system of "tit-for-tat" enforcement, corporate probation sanc-
tions should be tailored to rely on reform efforts by corporate managers
to the extent that cooperation is shown in return. Giving corporate man-
agers the opportunity to shape compliance standards to minimize disrup-
tion of legitimate business activities will motivate them to actively
participate in constructing probation terms and enforcing those terms as
internal corporate standards. Of course, where internal enforcement ef-
forts falter during a term of probation, a sentencing court can again
adopt a "tit-for-tat" enforcement philosophy and either impose more de-
manding probation terms or resentence the firm to a harsher fine.
Reliance on enforced self-regulation as a probation strategy has many
advantages over pure external enforcement of probation restrictions. It
allows probation constraints to be carefully matched to a particular
firm's operations and law compliance problems. At the same time, it
should help minimize the administrative burdens of compliance measures
on firm managers and coordinate compliance methods with other firm
activities. Because company personnel will undertake most compliance
enforcement and monitoring activities, this approach will force corporate
probationers to bear most probation enforcement costs. Furthermore,
corporate managers will have a stake in making a self-enforcement sys-
tem work effectively because the failure of this process will place their
firm at risk of resentencing and the imposition of harsher probation
terms or fines. With this motivation, corporate managers will tend to
apply internal corporate sanctions and investigative capabilities to insure
compliance with probation terms.
3) Mandated Restrictions with Enforcement Discretion
As a more onerous form of corporate probation, sentencing courts can
mandate probation restrictions developed for resistant firms by outside
experts. If a corporate probationer violates externally developed proba-
tion standards, a sentencing court will have the discretion to specify a
wide range of sanctions. The threat that a court will impose severe sanc-
tions on a firm that makes little effort to comply with probation terms
will motivate firm managers to seek methods to comply with mandated
restrictions. Hence, at a less substantial level of firm cooperation, man-
dated probation restrictions coupled with discretionary choices about
sanctions for violations constitute another valuable "tit-for-tat" variant.
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Because externally imposed probation terms will often not be sup-
ported by internal corporate enforcement mechanisms, extensive external
disclosures and studies will be needed to effectively monitor compliance
with such terms. To the extent that external compliance monitors have
substantial enforcement discretion, they also may be targets of co-option.
Mechanisms like peer review of monitoring efforts or monitoring assign-
ment rotations may be necessary to insure accurate evaluations of proba-
tion violations. While enforcement processes external to corporate
probationers will typically be more expensive to maintain than internal
enforcement arrangements, probationers can be forced to pay the costs of
external probation monitoring by appointed experts. Even if the govern-
ment bears some incremental costs from imposing externally monitored
corporate probation arrangements, a viable threat of externally devel-
oped and enforced probation schemes should be maintained to encourage
firm managers to make good faith efforts to propose probation terms
when they have the opportunity to do so and thereby avoid externally
imposed probation arrangements.
4) Mandated Restrictions with Defined or Presumed Sanctions
At an even higher level of compulsion, particularly recalcitrant firms
can be subjected to externally developed probation terms coupled with
pre-selected sanctions for failures to comply with particular probation
conditions. A similar approach would entail probation terms tied to
sanctions that the sentencing court will impose following a probation vio-
lation unless the firm presents compelling proof as to why those penalties
are inappropriate.
The advantage of these arrangements lies in matching harsh
mandatory sanctions with particularly serious probation violations. Seri-
ous probation violations would include violations in a pattern that re-
flects weak law compliance monitoring or enforcement efforts by
corporate managers or a single violation reflecting a flagrant disregard of
important probation restrictions. By promising harsh sanctions for pro-
bation violations like these, sentencing courts will provide clear warning
of serious consequences for these violations and create corresponding de-
terrents. Even managers who are otherwise resistant or oblivious to pro-
bation requirements may respond to clear statements of draconian
consequences for specific probation misconduct.
Threatened sanctions will often need to involve very serious conse-
quences to have this effect. The Sentencing Guidelines provide a good
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example of the type of strong sanction that sentencing courts can specify
as a consequence of serious probation violations.220 The Guidelines rec-
ognize that "[i]n the event of repeated, serious violations of conditions of
probation, the appointment of a master or trustee may be appropriate to
ensure compliance with court orders. 2 21 Because the appointment of a
master or a trustee would directly displace the powers of corporate man-
agers,222 the possibility of such an appointment will be a powerful and
meaningful threat to corporate leaders and encourage them to take sub-
stantial efforts to avoid its realization.223
2. Probation Sentences Expanding Offense Disclosures
Corporate probation terms can indirectly further post-offense reforms
in convicted firms by aiding governance and other private monitoring
and discipline processes. If the circumstances surrounding an offense,
including the possible involvement of senior officials, have not been ade-
quately clarified, probation terms can require critical evaluations of the
offense and disclosures of the results to further private accountability of
the firm or its managers.224 Sentencing courts can direct agents of the
corporation or outside experts such as special counsel to undertake stud-
ies of offenses for this purpose. The required product of these studies
should be a report that sets forth a factual account of the criminal behav-
ior underlying a corporate offense, the involvement of corporate person-
nel in the offense, and an evaluation of existing and potential control
systems to prevent similar offenses in the future. When completed, such
a report would be filed with the sentencing court for use by shareholders
in holding corporate officials accountable for their actions and by em-
220. A sentencing court might wish to frame a designated sanction in presumptive rather than
guaranteed terms to signal corporate managers that it is willing to adopt a lesser sanction for good
cause, thereby giving probationers an incentive to make improvements following a probation
violation.
221. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8D1.5 (comment.).
222. While it was "not the intent of the Committee [reporting the Act] that the courts manage
organizations as a part of probation supervision," S. REP. No. 225, supra note 9, at 99, the legislative
history does refer to probation arrangements entailing "effective supervision of a convicted . . .
union.... or brokerage house," id. at 131, which could be undertaken by probation officers "from
the requisite profession." Id. For example, auditors, accountants, lawyers, engineers, or exper-
ienced executives in the field could serve as probation officers.
223. Cf JOHN K. GALBRArrH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 77 (1967) (noting corporate
managers' strong aversion to outside interference with their control over corporate affairs).
224. Cf. John C. Coffee, Jr. et al., Standards for Organizational Probation: A Proposal to the
United States Sentencing Commission, 10 WHrrTER L. REv. 77, 83, 85-86, 92 (1988) (advocating
similar probation sentences).
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ployees, customers, suppliers, or others wishing to redefine their dealings
with the firm in light of its illegal conduct.
The goal of this form of probation sentencing would be to implement
in a sentencing context a parallel to the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission's practice of requiring an internal investigation and report on
securities law violations as part of case settlements under consent de-
crees.225 There, as here, the objective is to enhance corporate governance
and accountability processes to the benefit of both shareholders and the
public. Internal accountability generally cannot be restored unless the
corporate offender's board of directors and its shareholders have an ade-
quate understanding of the corporate conduct leading to a conviction.
Probation terms of the sort described here will help insure that they have
an independent source of information not limited by the unenthusiasm or
active discouragement of offense studies and revelations by corporate
managers.
Mandated offense studies and disclosures are particularly important to
counteract "an unfortunate plea bargaining dynamic" which tends to
conceal the substance of corporate offenses.226 Often, when a firm and its
top corporate officials are both prosecuted, the firm will agree to plead
guilty in exchange for an agreement by prosecutors to drop charges
against the individual officers. The corporation's plea may reveal little
about the circumstances of an offense or about the identity of those
within the corporate organization who were primarily responsible. To
the extent that one important goal of federal sentencing is "to promote
respect for the law,"' 227 sentencing courts should not permit the plea bar-
gaining process to become a barrier to public understanding of the culpa-
bility of individuals responsible for corporate crimes. Sentencing courts
can avoid this result by accepting corporate plea bargains, but insuring
through probation sentences that the circumstances of an offense are
thoroughly investigated and revealed.
3. Adverse Publicity
The Sentencing Guidelines support the imposition of probation terms
obligating a convicted organization to pay for adverse publicity concern-
ing its conviction. A sentencing court may
225. See, eg., John C. Coffee, Jr., Beyond the Shut-eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of
Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REv. 1099, 1271-72 (1977).
226. Coffee, et al., supra note 224, at 85.
227. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A).
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order the organization, at its expense and in the format and media specified
by the court, to publicize the nature of the offense committed, the fact of
conviction, the nature of the punishment imposed, and the steps that will be
taken to prevent the recurrence of similar offenses.228
Adverse publicity sanctions have been advocated as a response to cor-
porate crime for some years. In the early 1970s, the National Commis-
sion on Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws (the "Brown
Commission") considered proposals to authorize adverse publicity sanc-
tions for corporate offenders. An early draft of the proposed federal
criminal code would have authorized sentencing courts to require con-
victed firms to "give appropriate publicity to the conviction by notice to
the class or classes of persons or sector of the public interested in or
affected by the conviction, by advertising in designated areas or by desig-
nated media or otherwise. '229 However, the Brown Commission's final
proposals included only a victim notice provision. 230 The Brown Com-
mission rejected adverse publicity "as inappropriate with respect either
to organizations or to individuals, despite its possible deterrent effect,
since it came too close to the adoption of a policy approving social ridi-
cule as a sanction."' 231 Congress did not act on the Brown Commission's
proposals, but it did later provide for victim-notice sanctions involving
limited offense publicity aimed at promoting victim compensation. Con-
gress again considered broader adverse publicity sanctions, but rejected
them as beyond the compensatory goals of victim notices.232
In authorizing adverse publicity under the new Guidelines, the Sen-
tencing Commission apparently believed that federal courts possess the
authority to impose adverse publicity sanctions under Congress' broad
grant of power to develop and impose creative probation terms that fur-
228. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8D1.4(a). See generally Andrew Cowan, Scarlet Letters for Cor-
porations? Punishment by Publicity Under the New Sentencing Guidelines, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 2387
(1992).
229. NATIONAL COMM'N REFORM OF THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, STUDY DRAFT OF A
NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE 32 (1970).
230. Congress eventually addressed victim notice sanctions in the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(d), 3555.
231. FINAL REPORT, supra note 64, § 3007, at 276 (1971) (comment). But see Cowan, supra
note 228, at 2411-12 (arguing that ethical limitations on the use of public ridicule as a criminal
sanction should not be applied to artificial entities like corporations because they lack the human
capacity to be humiliated).
232. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 9, at 84-85 (noting that Congress did not intend the Sen-
tencing Reform Act's victim notice provisions to authorize "corrective advertising" or to subject a
defendant to public derision).
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ther the general goals of federal sentencing.233 The Commission recom-
mended adverse publicity as a corporate sanction not only to expand the
punitive options of sentencing courts, but also to increase corporate de-
terrents by playing upon managerial concerns about firm reputations.234
Corporate adverse publicity sanctions can serve a number of federal
sentencing goals.235 Such sanctions allow greater variation in criminal
deterrents and punishments than fines alone by adding reputational im-
pact as a further sentencing dimension. In addition, adverse publicity
may be the only means of punishment for financially weak firms. Ad-
verse publicity lowering corporate prestige may have a negative impact
on corporate managers and employees and, unlike economic sanctions,
cannot wholly be passed on to consumers or shareholders. Adverse pub-
licity often indirectly furthers the general deterrence and educational
goals of the criminal law by communicating details of crimes and related
punishments to potential offenders. Such publicity may also increase in-
dividual accountability for corporate misconduct by identifying persons
within firms who are responsible for corporate crimes and raising the
likelihood of civil damage claims and internal discipline affecting those
individuals. Adverse publicity may assist potential crime victims in pro-
tecting themselves by informing them about a firm's past misconduct.
Finally, adverse publicity attaches a degree of reputational stigma to all
members of a corporate organization and may therefore appropriately
impose penalties at the organizational level in cases where a sentencing
court cannot determine the individual responsible for an offense or where
a court can identify a few responsible individuals, but other unidentified
managers or employees share responsibility for the illegal conduct.
To a certain degree, corporate harm flowing from adverse publicity
may translate directly into lost revenues and corresponding financial
losses. When this occurs, adverse publicity is merely an indirect means
of imposing the equivalent of a fine. The amount of the economic harm
suffered due to adverse publicity will depend on the attitudes and con-
duct of persons receiving the adverse publicity. This means that the pub-
lic may serve a role in scaling the scope of corporate sanctions since the
233. See 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b).
234. See Wilkins, supra note 16, at 120 (1990).
235. For detailed analyses of the advantages of adverse publicity sanctions for corporate offend-
ers, see MARSHALL B. CLINARD & PETER C. YEAGER, CORPORATE CRIME 319-22 (1980); BRENT
FiSSE & JOHN BRAITHWArrE, THE IMPACT OF PUBLICITY ON CORPORATE OFFENDERS 285-314
(1983); Fisse, The Use of Publicity as a Criminal Sanction Against Business Corporations, supra note
151, at 107.
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degree of economic penalties flowing from adverse publicity will corre-
spond roughly to public perceptions of the severity of various crimes.
More likely, however, public reactions to adverse publicity will vary for
reasons other than assessments of crime severity, meaning that adverse
publicity will produce a pattern of economic impacts that are haphazard
and less desirable than directly imposed fines.
Because of the uncertain economic impacts that may follow, 2 36 the use
of adverse publicity solely to impose corporate financial hardship proba-
bly should be avoided. Courts should reserve adverse publicity for cir-
cumstances where it will achieve more than just a reduction in corporate
business activities and corresponding financial losses.
One such circumstance may be where adverse publicity will "achieve
deterrence by inducing loss of prestige or respect, provided that 'prestige'
and 'respect' are not merely qualities which reflect financial standing." '237
To the extent that corporate reputations do not directly translate into
corporate financial success, reputational impact offers a different dimen-
sion of punishment.2 31 The difficulty that remains lies in identifying
types of reputational impact that will be onerous to corporate personnel,
yet not immediately detrimental to corporate finances. One possible can-
didate is publicity that affects the willingness of highly qualified parties to
work at the convicted firm. To the extent that such publicity succeeds, it
may have little immediate impact on firm finances, but will affect the self-
image and morale of employees. It also will affect the future well-being
of the firm, which may cause firm managers to perceive the threat of such
publicity differently than fines.
Another type of adverse publicity with an impact beyond fines would
236. Adverse publicity mandated by sentencing courts may fail to produce desirable economic
results for a number of reasons. First, a court overseeing adverse publicity may prove to be a poor
propagandist and authorize publicity that does not produce the public reaction furthering sentencing
goals. Second, mandated publicity may be drowned out in the flood of information reaching the
public, causing the required publicity to be overlooked. Third, the corporation may be able to dilute
the reputational impact of mandated publicity by countervailing positive publicity. Fourth, the cor-
porate stigma from publicity about some highly technical regulatory crimes may be slight. Fifth, it
may be difficult to stigmatize a corporate defendant in a way that affects subsequent consumer be-
haviors because, in many fields, the consumer cares about the merit of a product not its supplier. See
Coffee, supra note 126, at 425-28. Cf. FISSE & BRAiTHwArrE, supra note 235, at 289-312 (recogniz-
ing the potential significance of many of these problems, but arguing that they can be overcome
through careful use of adverse publicity sanctions).
237. Fisse, supra note 151, at 118.
238. Mass media publicity about illegal conduct represents the most feared consequence of cor-
porate criminal convictions and sanctions according to both executives and law enforcement offi-
cials. See CLINARD & YEAGER, supra note 235, at 318 (1980).
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be focused disclosures aimed not at diminishing future corporate business
activities, but rather at reshaping their content. If the nature of a corpo-
rate offense is disclosed to persons contemplating future dealings with the
offending firm, they will have an opportunity to include monitoring or
performance checks in those dealings to protect themselves from repeat
offenses by the corporation. Thus, for example, if a firm is convicted of
undertaking a certain type of fraud against a limited set of customers,
adverse publicity aimed at reaching the firm's other customers might al-
low the unharmed customers to restructure their contracts and behavior
toward the convicted firm to diminish risks of similar frauds. 239
A third context in which adverse publicity may be useful involves us-
ing the public reputation of a firm to insure the implementation and con-
tinuation of post-offense reforms. Requiring a firm to publish periodic
reports on specific aspects of its probation conduct will give managers
strong incentives to shape that conduct to support favorable descriptions
before the public. For example, if a firm is required to publish monthly
reports on pollution discharges at company facilities along with commen-
tary on how those discharges compare with legal requirements and past
pollution levels at the same facilities, managers will not only have strong
incentives to make improvements, but they will have continuing motiva-
tions not to revert back to old ways. Of course, adverse publicity sanc-
tions structured this way would need to be coupled with probation
monitoring to insure that descriptions of corporate conduct in published
reports were accurate. Provided that this outside check on accurate re-
porting is implemented, it is unlikely that corporate managers will risk
probation sanctions, resentencing of their firms and heightened reputa-
tion losses by fraudulently manipulating a mandated pattern of corporate
advertising.
4. Punitive Probation Sentences
Another variety of corporate probation sentence involves probation
terms and requirements imposed to punish managers and employees of
the corporate offender and also, through the example of the offender's
239. In similar administrative settings, the Food and Drug Administration and the Federal
Trade Commission have compelled corrective advertising to overcome consumer fraud. See FisSE &
BRAiTHWArrE, supra note 235, at 286-87; Note, "Corrective Advertising" Orders of the Federal
Trade Commission, 85 HARv. L. Rnv. 477 (1971). For example, in ITT Continental Baking Co., 79
F.T.C. 248 (1971), the makers of Profile bread, having deceptively advertised the dietetic benefits of
their product, were required to state in 25% of their advertising that "Profile is not effective for
weight reduction."
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undesirable treatment, to increase general deterrents toward similar ille-
gal conduct by other firms.
In contrast to individual probation, which was almost exclusively a
means to reduce individual punishment, corporate probation terms im-
posed under the Federal Probation Act were sometimes used to increase
corporate punishment over levels that they could be imposed through
fines alone. Corporate probation terms inflicted punishment by requiring
firms to undertake actions that were onerous to firm managers and em-
ployees or which subjected the firm to public shame.2 4' For example,
one court required a firm to reassign several senior corporate officers to
work for service organizations as a form of "corporate penance. ' 241 Be-
sides their punitive effect, these probation terms served to rehabilitate
offending firms by insuring that employees contemplated the seriousness
of their firm's offense while undertaking the onerous acts required.242
Punitive probation terms also helped firms avoid the potentially devastat-
ing impact of large fines that might otherwise have been imposed.
As this Article noted in connection with punitive community service
orders, the Sentencing Guidelines provide little support for purely puni-
tive probation sentences,24 stressing instead the need to impose corpo-
rate punishment through corporate fines. However, when fines otherwise
recommended under the Guidelines are withheld due to a convicted
firm's inability to pay them, 244 a sentencing court should consider impos-
ing substitute punishments under probation terms. The onerous activi-
ties required should not be so costly that they threaten the firm's
viability,245 yet they should be significant enough to be remembered by
corporate personnel as a reminder of the seriousness of their firm's crimi-
nal conduct. Furthermore, the participation of top corporate leaders
might be compelled to insure that this reminder lodges at the top of the
organization. While the requirement of service by unconvicted execu-
tives or managers may raise due process concerns, such a requirement
240. Cf Fisse, supra note 117, at 1007 (explaining that corporate probation conditions can im-
pose appropriate punishment by "inflicting loss of autonomy, and possibly loss of prestige as well").
241. United States v. Wright Contracting Co., 563 F. Supp. 213, 214 (D. Md. 1983), rev'd on
other grounds, 728 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1984).
242. See, eg., United States v. Danilow Pastry Co., 563 F. Supp. 1159, 1167 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
243. Cf. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 9, at 96 (indicating that operational restrictions on con-
victed parties were "not [to] be used as a means of punishing the convicted person").
244. Sentencing courts must reduce corporate fines from normal recommended levels when the
imposition of the full recommended fine would substantially jeopardize the continued viability of a
corporation. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8C3.3.
245. Cf id. (imposing similar limits on the financial impacts of corporate fines).
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probably constitutes an acceptable burden under due process standards
where the affected party had some involvement in the corporate offense
under sentencing or where the burden of punitive probation requirements
is a fair complement to the party's high corporate position and associated
public trust and responsibility.24 6
IV. CONCLUSION
Rather than serving as a mere supplement to corporate fines, innova-
tive corporate sentences will increasingly be primary objectives of corpo-
rate criminal prosecutions. Two recent trends in corporate criminal law
may produce a shift in favor of remedial and reform sentences over puni-
tive fines. First, public attention to corporate misconduct has produced
growing pressure for harsh criminal sanctions applicable to ever broader
ranges of corporate crime.247 Recent statutes have responded to these
pressures by dramatically increasing maximum corporate fines for most
federal offenses.248 This has been coupled with a renewed interest in
criminally prosecuting corporations during the last two decades.249
Second, even as threatened criminal penalties have risen, the rationale
for imposing any corporate criminal liability under federal law has in-
creasingly been questioned. Federal standards which hold firms crimi-
nally liable for employee crimes without a separate showing of corporate
246. See Gruner, supra note 120, at 69-71.
247. One commentator has questioned whether public outrage over corporate crime has pro-
duced a form of institutional hatred toward corporations that may interfere with clear thinking
about corporate crime. According to Professor Albert W. Alschuler:
In 1991, the penal philosophy of many Americans is simple: "We like to snarl." We resent
crime, and in our rush to express our indignation, we may truly personify and hate the
corporation. We may hate the mahogany paneling, the Lear jet, the smokestack, the glass
tower, and all of the people inside. They-the mahogany and all of them-are responsible
for the oil spill, the price-fixing and the illegal campaign contributions. To superstitious
people, villains need not breathe; they may include Exxon and the phone company.
The corporation thus becomes for some of us, not Frankpledge, but deodand. Just as
primitive people hated and punished the wheel of a cart that had run someone over, or the
horse that had thrown its rider, or the sword that a murderer had used, some of us truly
manage to hate the corporate entity.
Albert W. Alschuler, Ancient Law and the Punishment of Corporations: Of Frankpledge and Deo-
dand, 71 B.U. L. Rv. 307, 312 (1991).
248. See United States Sentencing Comm., Notice of Proposed Additions to Sentencing Guide.
lines, 54 Fed. Reg. 47,056 to 47,057 (1989).
The most important enactment raising corporate fines was the Criminal Fines Enforcement Act,
Pub. L. No. 98-596, 98 Stat. 3134, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5433 (authorizing corporate fines
of up to $500,000 and higher fines of up to twice the offender's gain or victim's loss where pecuniary
gain or loss can be established).
249. KATHLEEN F. BRICKEY, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY § 1:01, at 3 (2d ed. 1991).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol71/iss2/3
1993] BEYOND FINES: INNOVATIVE CORPORATE SENTENCES
fault have been challenged as inconsistent with traditional criminal cul-
pability requirements. To reinject culpability measures into federal cor-
porate criminal law, numerous commentators have argued in favor of
organizational culpability proof as a prerequisite to corporate criminal
liability250 or due diligence defenses permitting firms to avoid liability
based on their lack of organizational culpability.2"' While none of these
proposals has been adopted, the heightened criminal penalties available
under the Sentencing Guidelines seem likely to accelerate this trend to-
wards reexamining the fault bases of corporate criminal liability under
federal law.
Amidst these conflicting trends-one tending to make corporate crimi-
nal liability more of a deterrent threat and the other, if successful, likely
to reduce this threat-innovative corporate sentences represent a rela-
tively uncontroversial dimension of federal criminal law.
Whatever beliefs one has about the need for corporate blameworthi-
ness as a basis for corporate criminal liability, these concerns seem less
serious in connection with prosecutions aimed at remedial and preventive
goals. Regardless of the degree of managerial fault involved in the
crimes, crimes undertaken for corporate benefit by employees and other
corporate agents often produce corporate gains, particularly when those
crimes go undetected and unpunished. Given their receipt of benefits
from corporate offenses, corporate organizations can fairly be called
upon to reduce offense injuries and pay associated remedial costs even in
the absence of managerial fault. Furthermore, a restitution rule internal-
izing these costs to offending firms will encourage appropriate levels of
preventive behavior, much like compensatory liability in tort.
Even if the affected interests of corporate shareholders are considered,
a clear basis for corporate restitution sentences is present. Assuming that
corporate organizational fault is irrelevant, crimes by corporate agents
raise a conflict between the interests of two innocent groups: crime vic-
250. E.g., Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal Lia-
bility, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1095, 1121-64 (1991); Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Mischief
Afoot: The Need for Incentives to Control Corporate Criminal Conduct, 71 B.U. L. REv. 447, 449-53
(1991); Ann Foerschler, Corporate Criminal Intent: Toward a Better Understanding of Corporate
Misconduct, 78 CAL. L. REv. 1287, 1306-11 (1990).
25 1. Eg., Developments in the Law, Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through
Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REv. 1227, 1257 (1979) (proposing a criminal defense allowing a
corporation subjected to liability under respondeat superior principles to "rebut [the] presumption of
liability by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it, as an organization, exercised due
diligence to prevent the crime").
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tims and corporate shareholders. As between these two groups, it is ap-
propriate to require shareholders to bear crime losses since they will
usually be in a better position to control or influence the commission of
crimes by corporate employees or agents. Corporate restitution and
other remedial sentences achieve this result.
Shifting to preventive sanctions, federal criminal liability for corporate
offenders has long been premised on the notion that firms have duties to
monitor and prevent criminal behavior by their agents. When preventive
systems are inadequate-and many corporate crimes suggest that they
are-the preventive goals of corporate criminal law dictate that
mandatory improvements in corporate practices are fair and valuable re-
sponses to corporate neglect in failing to prevent offenses.
Thus, under several notions of corporate responsibility for employee
and agent offenses, remedial and preventive sentences stand on firm
ground. The novelty of innovative corporate sentences authorized under
the new Sentencing Guidelines may delay the widespread use of these
sentences. But the ability of innovative sentences to address goals of sen-
tencing not served by other sanctions suggests that corporate sentences
beyond fines will have important roles in future corporate sentencing.
The Sentencing Guidelines open the door for new ranges of organiza-
tional sentences unlike individual sanctions that have come before. As
such, they are part of a growing body of distinctly organizational crimi-
nal standards suitable for a society dominated by organizational conduct
and plagued by related corporate crime.
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